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AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH INDUCED EDWARD HI TO ASSUME 
THE TITLE KING OF FRANCE. 



BY 



Prof. WALTER IREN^US LOWE, 

WELLS COLLEGE. 



(From the Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1900, 
Vol. I, pages 535-583.) 



WASHINGTON: 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1901. 



FEB 3 1903 
D.ofD, 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH INDUCED EDWARD III TO ASSUME 
THE TITLE KING OF FRANCE. 



BY 



Prof. WALTER IRENiEUS LOWE, 

WELLS COLLEGE. 



(From the Annual Report ol the American Historical Association for 1900, 
Vol. 1, pages 535-583.) 



WASHINGTON: 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1901. 



XVI— THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH INDUCED EDWARD III TO 
ASSUME THE TITLE KING OF FRANCE. 



By Prof. WALTER IREN^IUS LOWE, 

WELLS COLLEGE. 



535 



THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH INDUCED EDWARD III TO ASSUME 
THE TITLE KING OF FRANCE. 



By Prof. Waltee Irenjeus Lowe. 



No great historic institution is the result of a single cause. 
Neither can any great historic movement be adequately 
explained by referring it simpty to those causes whose opera- 
tions are limited to the immediate past. Historic characters, 
however, though the}^ are more or less unconsciously the 
products of forces which may be generations old, are con- 
sciously moved and swayed by considerations which they can 
see and know. A study, therefore, of the Hundred Years 
War would carry us back to the first days of English rule on 
the Continent. But in limiting ourselves to an investigation 
of the motives which induced Edward HI to proclaim himself 
King of France, it is enough to review briefly the latter part 
of Edward IPs reign in order to acquaint ourselves with the 
course of events which placed the young Prince of Wales as 
the nominal center, though not at first the actual leader of 
affairs. 

The death of Philip V and the accession of Charles IV to 
the throne of France first introduced Edward to the country 
toward which he was destined to direct so much of his atten- 
tion and energy. Though the new King soon gave unmis- 
takable evidence of his hostile designs against Guienne (1) x , 
Edward II was in no position to respond to his earlier sum- 
mons to render homage. The execution of Lancaster, how- 
ever, on March 22, 1322 (2), and the flight of the other 
rebellious barons to the Continent (3) freed the English sov- 
ereign, for the time at least, from the danger of domestic 
enemies ; and the thirteen years truce with Bruce (1) permitted 
him to turn from the northern marches to the French ambas- 
sadors who had crossed the channel early in August, 1323. 
Unfortunately the King had by this time completely fallen 

1 For references see end of paper, p. 57-4. 

537 



538 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



under the influence of the favorites for whose sakes he had 
struggled so strenuously, and he was prevailed upon by the 
younger Despencer and Baldock to make light of the new 
summons which was made (5). Events soon proved, however, 
that Charles's earnestness in the matter was but another indi- 
cation of his desire to get control of Guienne (6) where a dis- 
pute, which had already broken out about another question, 
(7) furnished one more excuse for prosecuting what now ap- 
peared to be the settled determination of the French Kings to 
absorb, as far as possible, the English continental possessions. 
It is in this policy of consolidation that we discover the key- 
note of the period which finally culminated in the Hundred 
Years War. 

For England no such consistent plan is as yet discernible. 
In the events which immediately transpire the spring of 
action is to be found in court intrigue, in a struggle in which 
not the nation's welfare, but the supremacy of the King's 
favorites as against the Queen, was the chief consideration. 
It will be easy, therefore, to detect the influence of the De- 
spencers in much that follows. 

Though the weak Edward had been persuaded to underesti- 
mate the importance of the French summons, he could not be 
allowed to ignore it entirely. A Parliament was therefore 
called for Lent, 1324 (8). At this meeting it was decided 
that the King should not cross the sea in person until he had 
sent solemn messengers to bear his excuses for his previous 
delay and gain, if possible, a further extension of time. 
Accordingly on March 11 Alexander Bicknor, Archbishop of 
Dublin, the Earl of Kent, and others, were commissioned to 
treat of affairs in Guienne and to arrange for a meeting 
between their sovereign and Charles, where all questions in 
dispute could be amicably settled (9). 

Though these ambassadors were well received at the French 
court, the King would grant them no hearing until he had 
received compensation for certain grievances which he claimed 
had been committed against him in Guienne, and of which 
Edward was entirely ignorant when he named his commis- 
sioners. On learning of the situation, however, he ordered an 
investigation (10). But when his ministers exceeded their 
authority and agreed that the chief offender in Charles's eyes, 
the English seneschal in Guienne, should answer in the ParJia- 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



539 



ment of Paris to the charges made against him, he repudiated 
their action. That this step was taken to maintain his legal 
rights rather than as a declaration of war is clearly shown by 
the sequel; for not only did Edward appoint a special com- 
mission to treat with Charles concerning his complaints, but 
he also yielded a partial consent to the demands which the 
French King had made as a preliminary to negotiations (11). 

Charles, however, was evidently bent on war. Refusing a 
safe-conduct to Edward's messengers, he maltreated them 
when they came to him without one (12), and about a month 
before the day set for the homage ceremony he ordered the 
count}^ of Ponthieu to be taken into his hands (13). Early 
in August the Count of Valois entered Guienne and war began, 
as the French claimed, because the English King had failed 
in his duty to his suzerain, but in reality to overthrow 
Edward's rights as immediate lord of the territory (11). 

This war is important for two reasons. In the first place 
it shows to what lengths the French Crown was ready to go 
in its desire for consolidation. In the second it created the 
situation which as much as any other one thing was the imme- 
diate cause of the Hundred Years War. It amply illustrates, 
too, what has already been suggested, that court intrigue at 
this time really determined England's foreign policy. 

The first period of hostilities was quickly over, thanks to 
Edward's delay in sending reinforcements,, and the aid which 
his continental subjects rendered to his foes (15). In two 
months the French had overrun the Agenois, and Kent had 
given provisional promise to a truce at La Reole whereby he 
agreed to surrender the town and see that the demands which 
Charles had made at Paris should be granted (16). The 
capitulation was made contrary to the wish of the English 
officers, but Kent was influenced by the Archbishop of Dublin, 
who now appears openly, what he had undoubtedly been 
secretly for a long while, an enemy of the younger Des- 
pencer (17). We now catch for the first time a glimpse of an 
influence which without doubt had long been working in the 
minds of the enemies of the favorites, and made them willing 
under the leadership of the Queen to degrade England, that 
in so doing they might cast discredit on the administration and 
so degrade the unpopular ministers. It is not too much to 
assume, when we consider how Isabella was introduced into 



540 AMEKICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



affairs at this juncture, and the turn which events took when 
she became supreme, that some secret understanding existed 
between herself and her brother. And Charles was not the 
man to allow the opportunity of furthering his own interests 
which his sister's cause presented to pass by unheeded. 

Edward, yielding to papal persuasions, finally accepted the 
arrangements which Kent had made, and on November 15, 

1324, appointed commissioners to treat for a final peace with 
France (18). He was not at all sanguine, however, of the 
success of this embassy, and so made preparations against the 
renewal of hostilities. He even went so far as to set May, 

1325, for his crossing to Guienne, but before that time 
arrived he had been induced to take the step which proved 
his ruin (19). As he had anticipated, negotiations did not 
prosper at Paris. Finally the French King intimated that the 
best Way to solve the difficulties which blocked the deliber- 
ations would be for Isabella to join the English embassy. In 
view of Edward's expressed desire to cross the channel him- 
self, if circumstances should favor such a move (20), it is diffi- 
cult to understand Charles's behavior at this time unless we 
accept the idea already presented that some secret under- 
standing existed between himself and his sister. Isabella's 
career in England from the very start had been an unhappy 
one (21), and now the rise of the Despencers so soon after 
Gaveston's overthrow, the confiscation of Cornwall on the 
outbreak of the French war, and her treatment in connection 
with that event had thoroughly roused her anger, which 
henceforth was not permitted to subside. 

The unwillingness of the favorites that the King should go 
abroad gave the Queen the opportunity she desired. Already 
her friends. Orlton and Burghersch, had advised her to seek 
relief from her distresses at her brother's court, and she had 
used all her blandishments on her husband to induce him to 
permit her to go abroad (22). Charles's request, therefore, 
could have caused little surprise to anyone save the miserable 
King, and he, finally yielding to the advice of his own and the 
papal ministers, named his wife as his representative at the 
French court (23). 

Isabella set sail early in March, 1325 (24), but several weeks 
elapsed before Edward was called upon to take any action in 
connection with the business which had called her over sea. 



EDWARD III, KING OF B'RANCE. 



541 



French ambassadors did not arrive in England until the mid- 
dle of April, too late for any action to be taken on the pre- 
liminary peace which they brought over with them (25). 
These articles embraced in the main the provisions which 
were later embodied in a treaty between France and England. 
Edward was asked to return an answer to them within a 
month after Easter, but so much of the allotted time had 
elapsed before he was informed of what was expected of him 
that he was unable to call a Parliament, and the few members 
of the council who were with him were unwilling to give 
advice on a question of so much importance in view of the 
dilemma which confronted them: the danger of losing Gui- 
enne by confiscation if they accepted Charles's proposals; by 
conquest, if they rejected them. The King accordingly gave 
to his ambassadors new powers and instructed them to treat 
for a further extension of time and to grant, under certain 
limitations, the French demands (26). 

On the basis of this action Charles appointed commissioners 
to treat for a final peace, and on May 31, 1325, a convention 
was signed at Paris, which Edward accepted at Westminster 
on June 13. By the provisions of this treaty the French 
King was pat in possession of Quienne and was empowered 
to appoint a seneschal to act in his name and to establish the 
regular machinery of government. It was further agreed 
that the homage ceremony should take place at Beauvais not 
later than the following August, and that both sovereigns 
should be present unless prevented by illness or some other 
excuse equally as good. Edward was then to receive the ter- 
ritories which he had intrusted to the hands of the French sov- 
ereign, and was guaranteed full and speedy justice regarding 
the other lands in the duchy. In this connection it was 
determined that, if the disputed districts were given back to 
England, Charles should be recompensed for the cost of seiz- 
ure; if it was decided that they should remain with France, 
he would remit all costs (27). 

The article which required Edward to go abroad was little 
pleasing to the Despencers who were afraid to cross to France, 
or, in the absence of the sovereign, to remain in England 
where a conspiracy against them had recently been unearthed 
(28). When, however, the council met on June 25 its members 
advised the King to cross the channel, and expressed their 



542 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



fears to recommend anything else lest Charles should carry 
out his evident desire of confiscation, and the} 7 at some future 
daj T should be held responsible for the policy which had pro- 
duced such baneful results (29). Edward, to the great distress 
of the favorites, according^ made ready to leave his kingdom 
(30). But in the midst of his preparations he was taken ill, 
and on August 24 he wrote from the Abbey of Langdon, near 
Dover, to the French authorities, informing them of his con- 
dition and requesting that another day be set for the homage 
ceremony (31). 

The Queen, who was as little pleased as the Despencers, with 
the prospect of meeting her husband in France, now came 
forward to make out of his failure to keep his engagements an 
opportunity to further her own designs. Until this time the 
chief charge against Edward had been that he had failed to 
render homage in person. That he should do so, was one of 
the provisions, as we have seen, of the recent treaty. But 
now, through Isabella's influence, without any suggestion from 
the King himself, and in the face of Edward's repeated declara- 
tions of his willingness to go to France, Charles, who had been 
clamoring so loudly for a personal interview, expressed his 
willingness to accept fealty from the young Prince of Wales 
if he should be sent to the Continent (32). Though Edward 
was at Dover ready to embark when this word came, he yielded 
to the persuasions of the Despencers and others and on Sep- 
tember 10 he granted the entire duchy of Guienne to his son 
on the conditions named in the letter of the French sovereign. 
Four days later the young Prince rendered homage at Beau- 
vais after a special dispensation, which was necessary on 
account of his youth, had been granted permitting him to do 
so (33). 

On October 15 Edward wrote to the Pope informing him 
that he had made every effort for peace, but with what result 
he could not tell (34). His suspicions had been aroused in 
two directions. Though Charles IV had received homage for 
the entire duchy of Guienne he had failed to deliver up the 
Agenois (35), and Isabella had refused to return to England, 
though she had accomplished her mission in France (36). 
It is at this time that the Queen reveals her plans more openly, 
and though we can not in this article follow in detail her 
career on the Continent, events soon proved the truth of the 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



543 



popular belief that she would never return home so long as 
the Despencers retained their position of influence near the 
King (37). Her conduct is important for us here as it shows 
that England's foreign policy was still subordinated to the 
interests of the rival leaders of the court factions. 

In December, 1325, Edward began a brisk correspondence 
with the Pope, the French King, and with his wife and son. 
His objects were to secure the return of the Prince with or 
without his mother and to establish the fact that he had done 
all in his power for the maintenance of peace (38). But peace 
could not be preserved, and so he reluctantly- prepared for the 
other alternative. On March 18, 1326, he requested Charles 
to send his son back to England irrespective of Isabella's 
wishes in the matter (39). But this the French King refused 
to do on account of his pretended fear for his nephew's safety, 
though Edward still protested his love for his wife and showed 
that his son was too young to be held accountable for anything 
which had transpired (40). Under such conditions it was but 
a step to open hostilities, and that was taken on July 6, when 
Edward declared war against the French King for his deten- 
tion of his wife and son and his hostile occupation of Gui- 
enne (41). Though he afterwards revoked these orders on 
receiving shadowy hopes of a possible friendly settlement, his 
action was in vain, for Charles, after having once led the 
English into war, was in no way inclined to lose the oppor- 
tunity which was thus presented of furthering his own and 
his sister's fortunes (42). 

Edward was soon forced, however, for another reason to 
stop all active measures of hostility against France. The 
details of Isabella's invasion and the masterly way in which 
she transformed it from an apparently righteous endeavor to 
free her husband from his unworthy favorites into a vindictive 
war against the husband himself, need not detain us here (43). 
The turn of events after Edward's forced abdication is, how- 
ever, of more importance. 

The conspirators, after having assured to themselves the 
rewards of the victory for which they had so long intrigued 
and sinned together, turned to foreign affairs. On February 
4, 1327, orders were given to restore to the alien priories the 
lands which had been confiscated on account of the war with 
France (44), and shortly after preliminaries . of peace were 



544 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



made (45). When we recall the true cause of this war, we 
are not surprised that an agreement was easily reached. 
Besides several minor provisions, each country promised to 
restore all conquests which had been made since the last treaty 
with Edward II (46). This was satisfactory so far as it went, 
but the unsettled condition in the Agenois still remained as a 
constant menace to permanent peace. For the time being, 
however, a graver danger threatened along the northern hori- 
zon, and the interest in England's foreign policy is transferred 
from France to Scotland. 

On December 26, 1326, Mortimer had begun a series of at- 
tempts to gain a final peace with Bruce (47). Though the 
Scottish historians are inclined to construe these overtures as 
a declaration of war (48), there seems to be little ground for 
doubting their genuineness. Isabella and Mortimer were too 
recently installed in power to risk unnecessarily a foreign war 
whose successful issue depended upon the aid of barons whose 
allegiance was so divided as to render any enthusiastic sup- 
port on their part very uncertain (49). Moreover, Isabella's 
cause had proven itself so popular in England that there was 
no need of the enthusiasm of a foreign war to gain the sup- 
port of the nation. If such a need had existed, past experi- 
ence and the commonest prudence would have suggested some 
other name than that of Bruce to lift to power through his 
misfortunes the aspirants for the control of English affairs. 
And finally, the very nature of the relations existing between 
the Queen and her paramour was such as to prevent any strong 
foreign policy, as this war and the French difficulties which 
came later abundantly proved. The ''disgraceful peace" 
which closed the Scotch war was laid at Mortimer's door. It 
was an attempt to compromise between the older feudalism, 
"a sort of free citizenship in several states," and the grow- 
ing national tendencies of the age. But, as in the case of 
France, these two conditions were irreconcilable, and the pro- 
visions which gave to James Douglas his estates in England 
and restored to Percy, Wake, and Beaumont their possessions 
in Scotland became the source of further trouble. 

Before the storm which the treaty of Northampton called 
forth had subsided, Isabella, moved perhaps by what she con- 
sidered to be her rights (50), or vainly hoping to regain her 
waning popularity in a cause which would appeal to the 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



545 



whole nation, involved England in another foreign con- 
troversy. 

By the death of Charles IV, on February 1, 1328, the royal 
family in France was left for the third time in a little over 
a decade without a male heir in the direct line of inheritance. 
Two names for the vacant throne came up for consideration — 
Philip of Valois and Edward III of England. 

In order to understand clearly the merits of their respective 
claims, it will be necessary to review briefly several questions 
which had already been decided regarding the rights of suc- 
cession (51). From the crowning of Hugh Capet until the 
death of Philip the Fair the throne had never been left without 
a male claimant in the direct line, and even then there seemed 
little likelihood of such a contingency. Louis X was poorly 
qualified to rule over the double kingdom which fell into his 
hands, and his reign formed a fitting prelude to the era of 
discord and sorrow which was in store for France. Charles of 
Valois, who practically stood at the head of affairs, showed 
little ability or desire to check the reactionary feudal move- 
ment which had set in. Famine and pestilence spread their 
devastations far and wide, and the death of the weak ruler, on 
June 5, 1316, left the distracted country to face a condition 
which had not been before it since the days of the Carolingian 
Kings. The direct line was broken and the National Assembly 
was called together to settle the question of succession. 

On hearing of his brother's death, Philip of Poitiers hurried 
to Paris with the intention of making himself master of the 
situation. In a concourse of barons it was agreed that the 
Queen, who was then with child, should be placed under 
Philip's care, with the understanding that he should act as 
guardian to the young King if Clemence should bear a son, 
but that he should become sovereign himself if she should give 
birth to a daughter. 

Since no provision was made for Louis X's heiress, Jeanne 
of Navarre, Duke Eudes of Burgundy refused to consent to 
this arrangement until justice had been promised to his niece. 
On July IT, therefore, Philip made a separate treaty with him 
whereby he agreed to relinquish Navarre, Champagne, and La 
Brie on the understanding that the remainder of Louis's do- 
mains should be left to him. If, however, the Queen should 
bear a son this convention was to be held null and void. 



H. Doc. 548, pt 1 35 



546 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



A boy was born on November 15, and although he lived 
but four days Philip judged his compact with Eudes to be 
abrogated and had himself crowned at Rheims during the fol- 
lowing January. This ceremony, however, by no means 
established his claims. Eudes protested most vigorously, and 
Charles, Count of March, refused to be present at his broth- 
er's coronation. Such opposition caused Philip to feel the 
need of some formal recognition of his position, so he called 
together the States General. Though the third estate was 
represented only by the delegates of Paris, the decision which 
they rendered in favor of the new sovereign was considered 
final. The doctors at the university approved their action, 
and so was formulated the principal that no woman could suc- 
ceed to the French throne (52). 

But even yet Philip did not feel entirely secure. The 
death of his only son, however, tended to lessen the opposi- 
tion of Charles. Burgundy's favor was purchased by a gen- 
erous sum of money and a marriage treaty, and the recogni- 
tion of the church and of Edward II was at last secured. So 
fully was this new principal of succession established that 
when Philip died in January, 1322, Charles IV succeeded 
without any opposition (53). 

The new King, as has been shown, ruled until February 1, 
1328. Like his brothers, he died with no son to inherit his 
throne. Though his wife was with child, a situation even 
more perplexing than in 1316 confronted France; for if the 
Queen should bear a daughter the male line of Philip the Fair 
would be extinct, and the throne must of necessity pass out 
of the Capetian family to some collateral line. Until the 
Queen should be delivered the question of the regency was the 
important one. although it was understood that the regent 
should become King in case a daughter should be born to the 
royal house. As, has already been stated, two names came 
before the States General for consideration. Edward's friends 
based his claim on the fact that he was the nearest male rela- 
tive to the deceased King. The Yalois party, starting with 
the admission that Isabella had no personal right to the 
throne, drew the conclusion that she could transmit no rights. 
This reasoning was approved by the majority and the regency 
was given to Philip. About a month later, on April 1. the 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



547 



Queen gave birth to a daughter and on May 29 Valois was 
crowned King at Rheims. 

There was, however, no such unanimity of opinion over 
this succession as there had been in the case of Charles, and 
Philip was called upon to meet the opposition of Navarre and 
England. Even before the coronation at Rheims Edward had 
been led by his mother to express his intentions of recovering 
his inheritance (54), and on May 16, two days after the disso- 
lution of the Northampton Parliament, commissioners were 
named to demand and receive for him all rights which he had 
as heir of the French Crown (55). Whether the English am- 
bassadors reached France in time to present their claims 
before Philip's coronation is uncertain. If they did, their 
presence made little difference in the course of events. 

Whatever Isabella's original designs may have been, the 
strained relations between herself and certain influential 
barons rendered her incapable of an} r decided action. As 
early as June 9 steps were taken toward a Flemish alliance, 
and until late in the autumn it looked as though war between 
France and England might break out at any moment. But 
on October 28 orders were given to return all goods captured 
from the French, and early in 1329 word was sent to Philip 
that Edward would render homage (56). 

In order to understand this sudden change of front we must 
trace briefly the domestic history of England since the disso- 
lution of the Northampton Parliament. The dissatisfaction 
caused by the Scotch treat} T was soon fanned by Mortimer's 
arrogance into such open and bitter hostility to the court 
party that it became practically impossible to transact any 
public business. A council which convened in July accom- 
plished nothing on account of the absence of so many of the 
barons (57), and a Parliament which was called at Salisbury, 
undoubtedly for the purpose of considering French affairs, 
merely conferred a few titles of nobility and adjourned to 
Westminster (58). 

Outside of Parliament, however, the most momentous things 
were happening. The barons, roused beyond endurance, had 
at last declared war against the favorite. But the defection of 
Kent and Norfolk forced them for the time to give over the 
strife. Early in 1329 Lancaster and other influential leaders 
were received back into favor, though only at the price of half 



548 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



their lands. The minor conspirators sought safety on the 
Continent (59). The favorite had baffled his enemies, but he 
did not feel entirely safe, as events will show. 

It was shortly after the overthrow of this conspiracy that 
the Queen was called upon to decide what attitude she would 
take toward the claim which she had put forward in young 
Edward's name to the throne of France. Philip of Valois 
immediately after his coronation had engaged in a war with 
the Flemings in behalf of their Count, against whom the sturdy 
burghers entertained the most righteous indignation. It is 
quite evident that the willingness of the new King to engage in 
this campaign was based as much on his desire to fortify himself 
in his new position by forcing his nobles to a practical recogni- 
tion of his rights as their military leader, as it was upon any 
sympathy for an unfortunate vassal or any knightly ambition 
to punish presumptuous citizens (60). It was not, however, 
until the celebration at Paris which followed the victory at 
Cassel that Philip sent his first communication to Edward III. 
The refusal of the English court to give heed to this summons 
led Philip to consult with his ministers about the advisability 
of taking Guienne into his own hands. Following their sug- 
gestion, however, he simply appropriated the revenues of the 
duchy and sent a second embassy across the channel. He 
revealed his earnestness in the matter by threatening imme- 
diate action against Edward in case of any further neglect 
of duty and by ordering the men of Languedoc to invade 
Guienne if this summons was disobeyed (61). 

This second call reached England early in February, 
shortly after the breakdown of the barons' conspiracy. It 
was not a time, therefore, when the Queen could count on any 
hearty sympathy and support if she should involve the nation 
in a foreign war. She was accordingly compelled to abandon 
her hostile attitude of the previous year, and promised to 
yield to the demands of the French King (62). On April 14 
she wrote to Philip in her son's name that Edward had 
hitherto failed to render homage only because of dangers 
which threatened him at home, but that he would now do so in 
person, though trouble had not yet entirely ceased (63). 

In view of the events which now transpired it was evident 
that the Queen had a double purpose in dispatching this let- 
ter. Her aim seems to have been to remove all ground for 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



549 



complaint by concealing the true motives which had hitherto 
directed her policy, and to explain beforehand any further 
delay by magnifying the difficulties in the way of the fulfill- 
ment of her promises. Relying, therefore, on the efficacy 
of this deception, the English court began most leisurely to 
plan for the young King's visit to France. Edward was not 
ready to sail until May 26, and even then he was not allowed 
to leave his country until a solemn, though secret, protest 
had been recorded that in rendering homage he did not intend 
to renounce his claims to the French throne, and that noth- 
ing but the fear of losing his continental possessions had 
induced the English authorities to yield at all to the demands 
of Philip (64). 

In spite of the splendor of the homage ceremony its out- 
come was little calculated to satisfy either party. Though 
Edward was completely dazzled by the reception which he 
received, he was allowed to forget neither his mother's preten- 
sions nor the just claims which England really did have in 
the matter. He consented to render general homage only, 
agreeing, however, to consult his records on his return to 
England, with a view to acknowledging liege homage if he 
should find that such was due (65). 

But there was another question which was destined to cause 
even more trouble than the homage controversy. Edward 
demanded the restitution of the lands which had been taken from 
his father and requested that he be allowed to render fealty for 
them. Philip, however, denied this petition on the ground 
that these territories had been captured in war and so were 
the rightful possessions of the French Crown. It was finally 
agreed that Edward should take the oath for that part of 
Guienne which he then held, and that if in so doing he felt 
that he did himself a wrong he should bring the whole matter 
before the Parliament of Paris. The Bishop of Lincoln then 
announced that 6 6 whatever the King of England said or did, or 
anyone else for him, he did not intend thereby to renounce 
any right which he had or ought to have in the duchy of 
Guienne, and that no new rights should accrue in this way to 
the King of France." The oath of allegiance was then ten- 
dered in the ordinary fashion (66). 

This was not a very satisfactory conclusion of the matter, 
but it was all that either side was willing to concede. In 



550 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



.spite of Edward's personal enthusiasm over his visit, the 
English authorities evinced little desire to bring about a final 
adjustment of the questions at issue. Philip accordingly sent 
over a third embassy to inquire into the reasons for delay. 
This delegation remained in England for over a year (67). 
During this period Edward's court was agitated by strange 
events which were to put an entirely new face on England's 
foreign policy and lift it above the petty interests of factional 
intrigue. 

The aim of Isabella and her paramour, ever since their 
unsatisfactory victory over Lancaster and his friends, seems 
to have been to stave off any final and definite understanding 
with France until another trial of strength with the barons 
had been made. This is clearly shown by the Amiens ceremony 
and the shifting policy which they adopted toward Philip's third 
embassy. Eight days after Edward's return from the Conti- 
nent the warden of the Cinque Ports and others received 
instructions which seemed to indicate a desire to cany out 
the new treaty, and on September 20, 1329, the Bishop of Nor- 
wich was commissioned to begin negotiations which continued 
into the next year and seemed to possess a certain semblance 
of sincerity through a renewal of marriage proposals between 
the royal families. But as the struggle with Kent approached 
a successful issue and Mortimer began to show those symp- _ 
toms which gained for him his title of " King of Folly," his 
tone took on another ring, and early in 1330 he almost came 
to an open breach with France on account of Alencon's too 
zealous behavior toward certain English forces which were 
collecting in the vicinity of Saintes (68). In January of this 
year, in a council at Eltham, where the final instructions had 
been given to the English commissioners, the King had been 
induced to demand a subsidy for a war with Philip in case he 
should decline "all reasonable terms of peace" (69). The 
refusal of the clergy to grant this request,- even after the calling 
of the Parliament which condemned Kent, may account for 
Mortimer's hesitation just at this time. On April 10 he 
appointed new commissioners to Paris. His instructions to 
them show how little he really cared for peace, for though he 
empowered them to continue friendly negotiations and bear 
Edward's excuses for not appearing in person to plead his 
cause as he had bound himself to do, he commanded them to 
object to the jurisdiction of Philip and of his Parliament (TO). 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



551 



In spite of this apparently friendly overture, Mortimer 
pushed his preparations for war with all diligence, and every- 
thing pointed to a speedy renewal of hostilities. But at this 
juncture what might almost be called the unexpected hap- 
pened, save for the evident insincerity underlying it all. On 
May 8, at Bois-de-Vincennes, an agreement was reached which 
not only ratified the treaty which Charles IV had made with 
his sister in 1327, but also the one he had forced on Edward 
II in 1325 (71). Though this appeared to be a step in the 
right direction, two important questions still remained to be 
settled. The jurisdiction of the Agenois may have appeared 
to be one step nearer a solution, but nothing was said or done 
to help along the homage controversy, and on this point 
trouble came almost immediately. In view of the action of 
both countries before and after this treaty, we are hardly 
justified in assuming that the omission of this subject was due 
to any oversight. As has already been suggested, Mortimer's 
chief aim was to gain time. Philip seems to have had two 
ends in view. He had no intention whatsoever of releasing 
his hold on the Agenois, but by making an apparent conces- 
sion he hoped, while in no respect weakening his own position, 
to open the way to a final adjustment of the homage dispute. 
He soon showed, however, that he would be satisfied with 
nothing less than liege homage, and cited Edward to appear 
before him on July 29 in the Parliament of Paris (72). Morti- 
mer caused this summons to be utterly disregarded. On July 
8, however, the same day on which the French treaty was 
ratified, he sent commissioners to Paris, though with no spe- 
cific instructions on the great point at issue. Such silence, 
coupled with the fact that the Duke of Cornwall had crossed 
over to Guienne in the latter part of May, did not point a very 
brilliant future for the Bois-de-Vincennes agreement (73). 

Edward's failure to appear in France in July induced Philip, 
on September 1, to send a second call for December 15 (74). 
This summons reached England shortly before Mortimer's 
fall. The favorite was well aware that there was some move- 
ment on foot against him, but his former victories had given 
him such a false sense of security that he continued to dictate 
his ambitious policy against France until his final disgrace (75). 

Mortimer's overthrow is important in that it at last freed 
the young King from the evil influences which had surrounded 



552 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



his life almost from his very first introduction into public 
affairs. Edward's proclamation on October 20, 1.330, that he 
intended henceforth to rule himself proved to be no idle boast, 
and the parliamentary writs which he issued on November 3 
mark a turning point in the domestic as well as the foreign pol- 
icy of his reign (76). After having inaugurated what appeared 
to be the most needed reforms at home the King set about of 
his own initiative to dispel the war cloud which hovered over 
England, and on January 16, 1331, he empowered the Bishop 
of Worcester to resume "amicable negotiations" with France 
(77). On March 30 he declared by his letters patent that he was 
bound to render liege homage to Philip and prescribed the form 
which he and his successors should use (78). Shortly after this, 
disguised as a merchant and accompanied only by his chancel- 
lor, his friend William Montacute, and about fifteen horsemen, 
he crossed over to France for the avowed purpose of perform- 
ing an oath which he had taken at a time of great personal dan- 
ger and attending to "certain other matters touching his own 
good and the welfare of his kingdom" (79). What these ' ' other 
matters " were soon appeared, for on April 13 Philip issued 
a proclamation accepting the fealty of the English sovereign 
in the form already prescribed, and consenting to a number of 
arrangements, all of which were intended to create and main- 
tain friendly relations between England and France (80). 

Edward's evident desire on his return home to carry out 
not only the letter but the spirit of these conventions (81) 
leaves no doubt as to his sincerity in his homage ceremony 
and the consequent renunciation of all claims to the French 
throne (82); but in spite of these pacific measures Philip 
would come to no agreement about the restitution of the 
Agenois, and the English King was finally forced on July 
16 to call a Parliament for September 30 to consider this mat- 
ter (83). This meeting recommended a continuation of the 
peace policy already so happily inaugurated, and suggested 
some marriage treaty as a possible wa}^ out of the difficulty. 
In accord with this advice Edward appointed a commission to 
treat with France, and on October 25 wrote to the Pope, urg- 
ing him to use his influence toward a friendly settlement of 
all questions in dispute (84). Meanwhile, trusting to Philip's 
sincerity, he was led to consider favorably a joint expedition 
to the Holy Land. Though the Parliament which was sum- 



-EDWARD III, KING- OF FRANCE. 



553 



moned considered this proposition favorably, it suggested a 
postponement for three years on account of the magnitude of 
the enterprise; but before that time had elapsed trouble with 
Scotland and the attitude of the French King had removed 
from Edward's mind all serious thoughts of a crusade (85). 

But there was another question of more immediate impor- 
tance which this Parliament had to settle. Philip had sug- 
gested to the ambassadors who had come to him concerning 
the Agenois that their master could gain better terms if he 
should cross over to France in person. Edward accordingly 
appointed a new commission to arrange for a meeting between 
himself and the French King (86). Before this delegation 
had accomplished anything, however, the English sovereign, 
not yet awake to Philip's ulterior motives against Guienne, 
had allowed his attention to be distracted from continental 
affairs, and when he was at last forced to take up these ques- 
tions again matters were in such a condition as to preclude all 
hopes of a friendly settlement. 

Very soon after his emancipation from his mother and her 
favorite, Edward turned his attention toward Ireland. The 
Parliament which condemned Mortimer to death passed a 
series of acts for this distracted country (87) and the one which 
convened in September, 1331, to consider French matters 
advised the King to assume personal charge of affairs in the 
island (88). On January 28, therefore, Edward began making 
preparations to go abroad, and named August 1 as the day 
for his sailing (89). But in the meanwhile came Philip's prop- 
position to cross over to France, so on July 12, at Parliament's 
advice, he postponed his Irish expedition until the following 
Michaelmas (90). Eight days later, however, he called a 
meeting at Westminster for September 9, for the specific pur- 
pose of considering the Irish question (91). But when this date 
had arrived affairs in Scotland had assumed an aspect so fav- 
orable to his designs against that country that he determined 
to temporarily turn all his attentions towards the north, and 
Parliament, on his representation of the situation, urged him 
to merely send troops to Ireland, while he himself should 
hasten towards the borders (92). 

It will be remembered that in the Northampton treaty a 
mutual restoration of confiscated estates had been agreed 
upon. The Scotch, though blameless in other respects, failed 



554 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



to carry out this provision. Edward, who shared in the gen- 
eral indignation over Mortimer's conventions with Bruce, still 
retained the conviction that he was rightful overlord of Scot- 
land (93), and by skillful diplomacy converted Moray's hesi- 
tancy to regard the restoration clause into an opportunity for 
asserting his claim by force of arms. On December 20, 1330, 
he wrote to the Scotch regent reminding him of his obliga- 
tions and urging a speedy adjustment of all disputes (94). 
This was the beginning of an extended correspondence in 
behalf of the disinherited barons (95). The fact, however, 
that Baliol, ever since 1330, had been a favored guest at 
the English court tended to discredit in the Scottish mind 
Edward's protestations of his altruistic motives (96). 

Moray's evasive answers finally induced the barons to join 
themselves to King David's rival and an elaborate invasion of 
Scotland was planned (97). While this enterprise was prepar- 
ing Baliol had an interview with Edward and promised to 
recognize him as overlord if he would aid him in this hazardous 
undertaking. The financial penalties involved in any fracture 
of the Northampton treaty prevented the English King from 
openly helping the conspirators. He did not hesitate, how- 
ever, to render secret sympathy, and Baliol, thus left undis- 
turbed to mature his plans, finally set sail from Ravenspur on 
July 31, 1332, and landed at Kingshorn on August 6 (98). 

The flight of David Bruce to France and the astonishing- 
series of events which resulted in BalioFs coronation on Sep- 
tember 24 did not, however, create a stable throne, and the 
pretender, after the loss of Perth, recognizing his own weak- 
ness, threw himself, late in October, on the protection of the 
English King (99). As a result of a secret meeting with 
certain emissaries from the south (100) he acknowledged on 
November 23 that his success had been due to the suff ranee of 
the English sovereign and to the aid which he had received from 
the subjects of that monarch. He promised, furthermore, to 
recognize Edward as his suzerain and rightful overlord of 
Scotland, and engaged to invest his new master with Berwick 
and other lands to the amount of £2,000 a year. The penal- 
ties which were imposed for any failure to carry out these and 
the other clauses of this agreement show how completely 
Baliol was under Edward's influence and painfully manifest 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



555 



his willingness to degrade Scotland in order that he might be 
permitted to wear a crown (101). 

It is now necessary to trace in England the events which 
led up to these remarkable transactions. Though Edward, 
by his apparent anxiety over the peace on the border (102), 
undertook to create the impression that he was striving to 
maintain not only the letter, but also the spirit, of the treaty 
with Scotland, he immediately set about to gain every advan- 
tage which the situation might offer. While he was busily 
engaged in this double policy the Westminster Parliament 
came together to consider Irish affairs. The King, as we have 
seen, by magnifying the danger from the north, succeeded in 
having Scotch affairs placed before all other matters (103). On 
October 20, desiring to sound his estates again, he called a 
meeting at York for December 2. But he did not wait for 
advice from Parliament before making preparations to reap 
the rewards of his questionable diplomacy. As early as 
October 7 he had ordered troops to collect, ostensibly for 
"the defense of the marches" (104), but since, on account of 
the distracted state of affairs in Scotland, there could be little 
real danger of any attack from that country, his real purpose 
appears only at the York Parliament. 

In addition to these military preparations, Edward had 
opened negotiations with both the Bruce and Baliol factions, 
with the evident intention of ascertaining what each would 
promise, so that he could shape his future policy accordingly 
(105). There is no record of the answer which the royal leaders 
returned to him, but it is evident from the subsequent course 
of events that, encouraged by their success at Perth, they 
failed to give any satisfactory response. We have seen, on 
the other hand, that Baliol, in his eagerness to maintain his 
position, consented to strip his throne of much of its honor 
and dignity, and professed to regard his kingdom as a fief of 
England. 

It was shortly after these negotiations that the York Par- 
liament assembled. Sir Geoffrey le Scroop, speaking for 
Edward, showed that he had carefully observed the injunc- 
tions laid upon him at Westminster, but that now, since he 
had learned that Baliol had made himself King, he wished to 
ask "whether he ought to go against Scotland himself and 



556 AMEBIC AN HISTOEICAL ASSOCIATION. 



claim the demesne of that country, or whether it were best 
for him to make himself a party and take the advantage of 
regaining those services which his ancestors had before him" 
(106). Instead of answering this question, Parliament asked 
until January 3 to consider. The King granted this request 
and issued new writs to those who had failed to respond to 
his earlier summons (107). But he was not idle during this 
interval. On December 12 he issued a safe conduct for Scotch 
commissioners who were coming to ask aid for Bruce, and two 
days later he sent a delegation to try the temper of the patriot 
party. He then wrote to the Pope informing him that at the 
advice of his Parliament he had postponed his Irish expedi- 
tion in order to be prepared in case of necessitj- to repel any 
invasion from Scotland (108). 

Meanwhile, across the border, events were transpiring which 
were to materially influence the actions of the English King. 
On December 16 Baliol was surprised at Annan and escaped 
with difficulty into England (109). 

When Parliament reassembled in January, 1333, it again 
refused to give any direct answer to the King, but advised 
him to refer the matter to the Pope and to the French sover- 
eign (110). Edward, however, refused to do this, and, after 
informing the Scotch that he would give no aid against his 
disinherited subjects, he opened correspondence with Baliol, 
who on February 12 had asked for assistance and had empow- 
ered his ambassadors to swear to the promises which he had 
made during the previous year (111). The usurper was mean- 
while preparing for a second invasion of the north, and on 
March 9 entered Scotland (112). 

Not long after the departure of this expedition the oppor- 
tunity for which Edward was so eagerly waiting arrived. 
Marauding bands of Scots crossed into England and plun- 
dered after the example which Baliol had set them in their 
own country, and the patriot leaders, incensed be} r ond endur- 
ance by Edward's two-faced policy, determined to retaliate. 
Their first endeavor ended in immediate disaster (113), and 
permitted the English King to drop the mask which had so 
scantily concealed his designs. 

With the opportunity Edward was ready to act. As early 
as March 20 he had begun to collect forces and supplies, and 
when about to set out from Newcastle, mindful of the dangers 



EDWARD III, KING OF FKANCE. 



557 



which threatened Baliol's earlier movements, he besought the 
Count and commonalties of Flanders to prevent their citizens 
from aiding the Scotch (114). But the Bruce party had an 
ally of far more importance than mercenaries from the Low 
Countries, and Edward even now had experienced for the 
first time that interference with his plans which, as it grew 
more pronounced and gradually revealed its true purpose, 
compelled him to relinquish his endeavors to regain a suprem- 
acy already lost, and forced him to direct all his energies to- 
ward maintaining his control over his continental possessions. 

Philip, who had furnished an asylum for David Bruce since 
Dupplin Moor, soon began active measures in his protege's 
behalf, and early in 1333 he sent ambassadors across the chan- 
nel. They appeared before Edward on the eve of his departure 
for the north. The substance of their message to the English 
sovereign appears in his attempt to justify himself for his 
proceedings by charging to his enemies the infraction of the 
treaty which had been made with Robert Bruce (115). He did 
not, however, stop his preparations because of this inter- 
ference, and about the middle of May he appeared before 
Berwick (116). 

The details of the long war which now ensued can find no 
place in this paper, save as they reveal Philip's endeavors to 
make out of them an opportunity to further his designs against 
Guienne. Notwithstanding Edward's protests that war had 
been forced upon him, the French sovereign failed to cham- 
pion his vassal's cause. On the other hand, he began actively 
and openly to aid the Bruce interest. During the operations 
around Berwick he sent out a large fleet to support the defend- 
ers. Though on account of storms it failed to render any 
effective service, it nevertheless revealed to Edward what the 
future might bring forth (117). In spite of this fact, how- 
ever, the English King, on his return southward after his vic- 
torious campaign, summoned a Parliament for September 19 to 
resume the thread of French affairs, which had been dropped 
at Westminister in 1332 (118). But Philip did not seem par- 
ticularly desirous of encouraging negotiations, and an out- 
break against Baliol's authority again drew Edward's attention 
toward Scotland. He did not set out on this new campaign, 
however, until he had appointed commissioners to treat con- 
cerning affairs in Guienne, and to arrange for a meeting 



558 AMEBIC AN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



between himself and the French King, where all questions, 
including that of the crusade, could be talked over (119). The 
only response to these overtures, however, was continued inter- 
ference in Scotch affairs, and Edward was finalty induced, in 
April, 1335, to grant an armistice, on the promise that the 
Bruce leaders would do the same (120). 

Though the ambassadors whom Philip had sent to England 
at the Pope's request had been loud in their clamors for peace, 
their master gave little evidence of any desire that their en- 
deavors should be successful (121), and the truce which was 
granted was in fact but little more than a preliminary to fur- 
ther hostilities (122). Edward, though he would not consider 
a permanent peace, was not, perhaps, unwilling to gain a 
temporary breathing spell in order to perfect arrangements 
which he had been endeavoring to complete under consider- 
able difficulties (123); and the Scotch, who were in constant 
touch with the French emissaries, were undoubtedly glad of 
this opportunity to remove, if possible, the danger of divided 
counsels which threatened them at home (124). 

During the campaign which followed the expiration of the 
truce the French King had an opportunity to show his hand more 
clearly. Even before the outbreak of hostilities Edward was 
called upon to look into the character of a fleet which was fit- 
ting out at Calais, and as early as July, 1335, and again during 
the year, he was forced to issue orders for the protection of his 
coasts (125). On July 7, Philip officially informed the English 
authorities that he was bound by treaty to render aid to the 
Scotch against them in case of a war. He, however, pretended 
a great desire for peace, and proposed that the whole Scottish 
question be referred to himself and the Pope for arbitration 
(126). This word reached Edward on August 20, two days after 
a treaty with Athole, whereby practically the whole of Scot- 
land was placed under his control (127). It is not surprising, 
therefore, in view of Philip's behavior, that he declined to 
consider any propositions which he knew would result detri- 
mentally to his own interests (128), even though he had but 
recently attempted to reach some friendly settlement about 
continental and crusading matters (129). The main object of 
the French King at this time seems to have been to shift upon 
his rival all responsibility for any hostilities which might en- 
sue. How little he really cared for peace appears in a com- 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



559 



munication to the Pope. This letter is not preserved to us, 
but its tenor can be easily conjectured from the answer it 
received. Though Philip again urged his treaty obligations 
with the Scotch, he evidently made no suggestion looking 
toward arbitration, for Benedict exercised all his powers of 
argument to dissuade him from entering on a project whose 
outcome was so uncertain (130). 

From this time forth the French King took no pains to con- 
ceal his hostile intentions, and by 1336 continental questions 
were so entangled with the Scotch controversy that any peace- 
ful solution of the difficulty became practically impossible. 
As early as April of this year Edward had occasion to write 
concerning matters in Guienne, and when, on July 6, he 
appointed commissioners to treat of these affairs he empowered 
them to make terms, if possible, with David Bruce (131). But 
both the French and Scotch sovereigns refused to negotiate, 
and Philip unhesitatingly announced his intentions to aid the 
Scotch. Edward, accordingly, on August 21, summoned a 
Parliament for September 23 (132). 

Though the French King spurned the first friendly advances 
which had been made to him, he afterwards pretended to be 
desirous of sending ambassadors to England, and Edward, on 
September 1, issued a safe conduct for the messengers which 
he thought were about to come to him. But the expected 
ministers never came, and Philip soon gave evidence that he 
had never intended to send them (133). 

When Parliament assembled it granted a liberal subsidy, a 
step which was painfully necessary if the King was to main- 
tain his position in the north, or was to ward off the danger 
which threatened him from over seas (134). As early as Sep- 
tember 3 he had been forced to collect a fleet against a French 
squadron that was hovering off his shores, and in October he 
was compelled to again take personal direction of operations 
in Scotland (135). But his presence failed to create the same 
impression as in former campaigns. The regent, encouraged 
by hopes of foreign aid, kept the field (136), and, distracted 
beyond measure by the danger from the French which threat- 
ened both England and Guienne, Edward finally moved toward 
the south in order to be in closer touch with the defensive 
measures which he was compelled to institute (137). 

Philip had set about his preparations to aid the Scotch 



560 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



in no meager fashion (138), and on December 10 Edward 
summoned his Parliament for the following January to take 
counsel concerning the dangers which threatened the realm. 
He was compelled, however, to postpone this meeting until 
February 9 (139). 

In order to appreciate the action that was taken at this 
time, it becomes necessary to introduce a personage whose 
presence in England gave the French King his last excuse for 
pursuing the aggressive polic} T which he had adopted toward 
Guienne. 

When the Count of Yalois was consecrated as the legiti- 
mate successor of the last Capetian, one of the chief person- 
ages at the coronation ceremony was Robert of Artois. On 
account of a disputed succession in his county, however, the 
friendly relations existing between him and the new sov- 
ereign were soon converted into the most bitter enmity. 
Hounded from one continental state to another. Artois finally 
took refuge in England, where he soon rose high in the favor 
of the King. Encouraged by his friendly reception he 
requested Edward to gain for him the privilege of presenting 
his cause once more before the Parliament of peers. But 
when this was denied him. and Philip's persecutions continued, 
he undertook to arouse the animosity of his new patron 
against his old friend, and urged Edward to reassert the claims 
which Isabella had once put forward for him to the throne of 
France (110). 

Though Robert failed to divert Edward's attention from 
Scotland, Philip succeeded most admirably in rousing his 
personal resentment in behalf of his protege. On August 
26, 1336, the pope sent messages to England to urge peace, 
but he plainly intimated that peace would be impossible so 
long as Robert of Artois remained at court. Edward, already 
wearied with his fruitless negotiations, accepted this state- 
ment as final. On December 26 Philip wrote to the senes- 
chal of Bordeaux to say that his master was bound as a peer 
of France to deliver up Artois for punishment. As Edward 
paid no attention to this indirect summons, the French King, 
on March 7, 1337, issued a prohibition "to all men, liege or 
free, of whatsoever condition, whether living within or with- 
out the kingdom, from giving counsel, comfort, aid, or suc- 
cor to Robert in any way whatsoever, or from allowing him 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



561 



to remain in their territories" (141). But even before this he 
had given unmistakable signs of how matters must finally 
culminate ; and Edward, having left the marchers to deal with 
affairs in Scotland, had consulted his Parliament concerning 
the dangers which threatened from abroad. 

Unfortunately, no official reports of what happened at this 
time have come down to us, and we are compelled to look to 
outside sources for our information. Though it was evident 
that war with France was inevitable, and Edward, even while 
Parliament was in session, was called upon to institute new 
measures for the defense of his continental possessions (142), 
the magnitude of the enterprise, coupled with the unsettled 
condition of things in the north, enforced a careful and delib- 
erate policy. Artois, whose animosity had by this time 
reached fever heat, induced Edward, by dint of continuous 
importunities, to question Parliament as to the propriety "of 
reviving the old claims to the French throne (113). Before 
answering this question, however, or even considering the 
more general one of war with France, the estates suggested 
that the Count of Hainault be consulted in the matter. This 
nobleman, who had his own personal grievances against Philip, 
was in no way loth to see his enemy humbled. But he, too, 
recognized the seriousness of war, and so advised the English 
commissioners who came to him to seek the alliance of vari- 
ous continental states before taking an}^ final step. Thus was 
inaugurated the policy from which Edward afterwards hoped 
so much, but actually gained so little. The King was not 
read} r , however, even yet, to abandon all hopes of a peace- 
ful settlement, so when he named his commissioners to the 
Continent he empowered them to treat concerning all ques- 
tions then before the Parliament of Paris (144). From what 
afterwards happened at Valenciennes it is evident that he also 
gave them explicit instructions concerning Artois. 

The first fruits of the endeavors of the English ambassadors 
was a conference of representatives from the Low Countries 
and Germany, which met at Valenciennes (145). Though 
Philip, yielding to papal influences, had promised to send 
delegates to Hainault, he failed to keep his word, and finally an 
embassy consisting of Jeanne of Valois, Sir John of Hainault, 
and others, was sent to inquire into the cause of his delin- 

H. Doc. 548, pt 1 36 



562 AMERICAN" HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



quency (146). Meanwhile the Bishop of Lincoln showed that 
his master was not entering upon this war through ambition 
or vainglory, but that on the other hand he was most eager 
for peace, if peace could be gained on honorable terms and the 
English claims in Scotland and Guienne be preserved. The 
confiscation of Guienne, however (147), and the news that the 
French King would not consent to treat put an end to all 
hopes of a friendly accommodation, and early in June war 
actually began along the borders (148). 

After the breaking up of the Valenciennes conference the 
English legates set about their business of gaining alliances in 
grim earnest, and, by playing upon the numerous causes of 
camplaint which existed against Philip, the}^ succeeded, before 
their return home in August, in gaining a goodly number of 
promises of assistance from various nobles and princes in 
Germany and the Low Countries. Of especial importance was 
the compact made with the Emperor on July 13, whereby 
mutual aid was promised against all common enemies and 
especially against the King of France (149). 

Meanwhile, Edward had not been idle. On June 8 he 
received word from his ambassadors, and four days later ex- 
pressed his determination of crossing over to Guienne in per- 
son. Before he was able to carry out this idea, however, 
events had transpired which materially changed his original 
plans for a campaign (150). 

The return of the ambassadors from the Continent put new 
vigor into the King's preparations. On August 18 he sum- 
moned a Parliament for September 26 to provide for the 
government of the realm during his absence in Guienne, and 
on the 21st, and again on the 28th, he issued what might be 
called his first declaration of war (151). On the 26th he rati- 
fied the treaty with the Emperor and various other conven- 
tions which the Bishop of Lincoln had made (152). 

These documents are important as revealing Edward's posi- 
tion on the eve of hostilities. His real reasons for entering 
upon the war appear in his letters to the nation, and are 
simply the old complaints which he had been compelled to 
make so many times before: the persistent aid which the 
French extended to the Scotch, and their unveiled efforts to 
confiscate Guienne. It is important to note also that he still 
applied to Philip the title King of France, thus clearly indi- 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



563 



eating that he had as yet no serious intention of claiming that 
dignity for himself. This is quite evident in spite of the fact 
that at this very time, in his letter to the Emperor, he writes 
of Philip as " calling himself King of France" (153). This is 
the first intimation that he had any intention whatsoever of 
questioning that monarch's right to the throne. In deter-" 
mining his motives several things must be taken into account. 
The fact that he did not again employ this or any similar 
expression for so long a time creates a strong presumption, at 
least, that at the beginning of hostilities he attached very little 
importance to it in his own mind. A careful analysis of sub- 
sequent events confirms and strengthens this view. As we 
have just seen, Edward, in his letter of August 28, did not in 
any way make Philip's title a cause for war, nor did he, save 
on one occasion, under the spur of Artois's influence, and in 
his correspondence concerning* his foreign alliances, make any 
intimation of this sort until after he had quartered the French 
and English arms. Now, it will be shown that this last step 
was a war measure pure and simple. There is little reason 
for interpreting the earlier hints in any other way. It must 
be remembered that Edward was seeking aid among those 
who, for various causes, were nursing grievances against 
Philip. His own particular complaints in Scotland and 
Guienne would be of little interest to his allies. A promise, 
as King of France, to remove theirs might prove a strong 
bond of union. 

On September 19 John de Thrandestone arrived in England 
(151), and in view of the news he brought with him Edward 
determined to postpone for the time his expedition to Guienne. 
Though the Parliament which met at Westminster proposed 
vigorous measures, and the King was disposed to listen fa- 
vorably to the entreaties of his allies to cross over sea, it was 
determined to make one last endeavor to gain by negotiation 
what, in view of the ever closer union between France and 
Scotland, appeared so hazardous to attempt by war. On 
October 3, therefore, Edward commissioned the Bishop of 
Lincoln and others to treat for a settlement of disputes in 
Guienne, and if possible to arrange a truce or a final peace 
with both France and Scotland (155). Fearful, however, of the 
results of this mission he empowered them to negotiate for 
further alliances on the Continent (156). The next day, the 



564 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



same on which Parliament adjourned, the English delegates 
received their credentials and departed from London (157). 
Before they left the country, however, the King was led to 
take a step of quite a different character. 

Robert of Artois had been among the first to welcome back 
to England the men who had been sent to try the temper of 
the rulers in Germany and the Low Countries, and he had been 
an interested observer of events since their return. Now, in 
the instructions which the Westminster Parliament gave to 
the Bishop of Lincoln and his colleagues, Philip was st}4ed 
"the illustrious King of France." This was directly opposed 
to Count Robert's advice, as we know, and not at all in 
keeping with the precedent established in Edward's letter to 
Louis of Bavaria. It is this backward step, as it undoubtedly 
appeared to Artois, that probably explains the peculiar scene 
which now transpired. In a banquet at London, Robert, by 
means of ingenious taunts, succeeded in inducing the King to 
swear in a decidedly braggadocia manner that before the year 
had passed he would install his wife as Queen of France, though 
he could muster but one man to Philip's four (158). In accord- 
ance with this oath, therefore, he instructed his ambassadors to 
bear his defiance to Philip (159), and named the Duke of 
Brabant his vicar in France (160). 

While these things were transpiring in England papal em- 
issaries were busy at the French court, and finally persuaded 
the King to stop all hostile operations against Guienne from 
October 4 till the following Christmas if Edward would not 
invade Scotland or France. Unfortunately the appearance of 
the English ambassadors just at this juncture created the 
impression that active measures were in preparation, so Philip 
sent the Count of Alencon to guard his coasts from hostile 
attack. But the expected invasion did not come, for a combi- 
nation of circumstances prevented Edward from crossing the 
channel (161). 

The first interruption came from the Scotch, and finally, on 
January 4, 1338, Edward began active measures against them. 
It was not until April that he abandoned what turned out to 
be a very unsatisfactory campaign in order to give his undi- 
vided attention to France (162). Meanwhile another influ- 
ence was at work which illustrates his attitude toward Philip 
even as clearly as the precedence which he gave to Scotch over 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



565 



French affairs. Late in September or early in October, 1337, 
Edward learned that papal messengers were about to come to 
England. Knowing their mission and wishing to justify him- 
self for the steps which he had taken, he wrote to Benedict to 
explain why he had declared war and had allied himself with 
the Emperor. This letter is important as revealing his real 
attitude toward the claims which he had so recently made. If 
he had been possessed by the sincere conviction that Philip 
unjustly occupied the French throne he would have made this 
a principal cause for hostilities. He, however, merely repeats 
the phrase used in -his treaty with Louis, and elaborates as his 
genuine grievances the French aid to the Scotch and their 
unwarranted attacks on Guienne (163). 

The arrival of the papal legates about the middle of Decem- 
ber produced a decided, though temporary, influence on affairs, 
and illustrates how great was the Pope's power even during 
the Avignon period. On December 10 the King summoned a 
Parliament for February 3, 1338, to consider Benedict's pro- 
posals, but meanwhile, on the 21th, probably having been in- 
formed of Philip's consent to an armistice, he agreed not to 
invade France until March 1 (161). His willingness to make 
this concession at this advanced stage of affairs is worthy of 
note, for in addition to his complaints in Guienne, his wrath 
had been aroused in another direction. 

Ever since 1315, when Louis de Nevers had submitted to 
the French King, the interests of the Flemish people, had 
brought them into sharp conflict with their Count. The battle 
of Cassel had not tended to heal this breach (165); and with 
the growing trouble between France and England, Flanders, 
with its turbulent internal history, became an important factor 
in the contest. The constant uprising against the Count's 
authority exasperated him beyond endurance, and, unmindful 
of the interests of his people and desirous only of pleasing his 
royal friend at Paris, he ordered, in 1336, the arrest of all 
English subjects in Flanders. Edward immediately retaliated. 
On October 5 he ordered the arrest of all Flemings wherever 
found within his borders, and on the 18th, after sending a 
protest to Louis for his behavior, prohibited the export of 
wool to Flanders until he could learn the result of his let- 
ter (166). So rigorously did he enforce this injunction that he 
would not grant the request of the Duke of Brabant to estab- 



566 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



lish a staple in his country until he had promised that the 
Flemings would in no way benefit by such a concession (167). 
The greatest distress immediately prevailed in the large manu- 
facturing cities, but the Count would not yield though Edward 
was most eager to gain his friendship (168). The English King- 
had been advised of the importance of gaining the Flemings 
as his allies in the approaching war with France, so when he 
sent his commissioners to the Continent in 1337 he gave them 
letters of credence to Louis of Crecy and to the commonalties 
of Bruges, Ghent, and Ypres (169). The inhabitants of the 
cities received them cordially, though the Count remained as 
hostile as before. At Ghent, particularly, party feeling ran 
high, and when Edward's ministers reached the city they were 
accorded a hearty welcome by both the aristocratic and popu- 
lar parties, which were at this time united in one common 
hatred against their ruler (170). Sohier de Courtrai, who 
seemed to act as their representative, not only declared for an 
English alliance, but justified this action on the ground that 
Edward III was rightful King of France (171). He did this 
undoubtedly in the hopes of interposing between the city and 
its Count an overlord whose own interests would work for 
both the industrial and political well-being of the people. The 
subsequent arrest and death of Courtrai and the formation of 
a closer alliance between Louis and his protector quashed, 
however, for the time being, all hopes of aid from this quar- 
ter (172). 

Louis, who saw with deep concern the efforts of the Eng- 
lish negotiations on his people, sent his natural brother to f or- 
tify the island of Cadsand (173), with the evident intention of 
intercepting the Bishop of Lincoln and his colleagues on their 
way home, and of checking, as far as possible, any further 
communication with the Continent. This occupation seriously 
interfered with Edward's plan of exporting wool to Brabant 
(174), and Sir Walter Manny was accordingly instructed to oust 
the Flemish garrison. He captured the island on November 
10 and took Sir Guv a captive to England (175). 

In spite of Edward's concessions, the year 1338 brought 
small hopes of peace. Though he extended the truce until 
June 24, and further agreed not to invade France at all until 
due notice had been given, he granted these terms rather 
through papal intervention than because of anj T liveh T hope 



EDWARD III, KING OP FRANCE. 



567 



that at this late day hostilities could be avoided. He there- 
fore continued his preparations for war (176), and the Parlia- 
ment, which assembled on February 3 to consider French af- 
fairs, informed the cardinals that there could be no final peace 
with Philip until he had returned the lands in Guienne, which 
he had unjustly held for so long a while (177). 

Meanwhile Philip was giving ample evidence that there was 
but little likelihood of his ever agreeing to these conditions. 
As early as January 8 Edward was forced to ask the common- 
alty of Genoa to prevent the sailing of certain galleys, which 
were being fitted out for his enemies (178). He was soon 
called upon to face a more serious danger. Philip, evidently 
eager to gain possession of Guienne before it could be de- 
fended from abroad, collected an army in Languedoc, and in 
April entered the Agenois (179). In March Edward, who 
was then at Berwick, learned that a combined French and 
Scotch attack was being planned against his coasts, and on the 
23d of this month his enemies sacked the city of Portsmouth 
(180). In view of these facts, it is not surprising that, though 
he still paid deference to papal influence (181), he also contin- 
ued preparations for war (182). Finally, on May 6, wearied 
by his useless efforts, he declared the truce to be revoked, 
since Philip refused to observe it (183). From this time forth 
he pushed his plans for crossing the channel, and on July 16 
he set sail from Orwell. Six days later he landed at Antwpvi^ 
(184) -' lU ~ vr P roven itself 

When Edward reached the Continent he lost no time in 
taking up the business for which he had come. After having 
annulled a commission, which he had granted on June 21 at 
papal intervention to treat with Philip u as King of France," 
he set about strengthening his alliances for the campaign upon 
which he was so eager to enter (185). But his enthusiasm 
was by no means shared b} r those on whose aid he had counted 
so much. Disappointment met him almost at every turn. 
His allies at first hung back because of the nonpayment of 
their promised subsidies, and he was forced to adopt severe 
measures to secure the wool which was to remove this diffi- 
culty (186). Then the Duke of Brabant developed a fatal 
facility in inventing excuses for delay and had to be further 
bribed by generous commercial privileges (187). But even 
this failed to be effective, and finally the princes shifted their 



568 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



responsibility by telling Edward that he must secure author- 
ity as imperial vicar before they could render him active serv- 
ice. The King accordingly set out for Coblentz and met the 
Emperor late in August or early in September. The nego- 
tiations which followed are significant (188). Louis, angered 
by French encroachments on the Empire and roused as well 
by Philip's duplicity as by papal animosity toward himself, 
was not unwilling to strengthen the treaty already made with 
England, and Edward skillfully played upon his friend's 
resentment in order to subserve his own ends. Philip was 
made out to be a usurper, not only from the English, but also 
from the German point of view, and Edward was commissioned 
by the" defender of justice in all Christendom'' to punish him 
for his crimes. He accordingly arranged a campaign for the 
following July, ostensibly for the recovery of Cambrai. which 
the French unjustly occupied. 

There now lay before the English King a winter of forced 
inactivity, during which he strove most earnestly but in vain 
to gather military capital for himself. Though a few unim- 
portant alliances were negotiated, the Flemings, whose aid 
Edward, as we have seen, had early sought to gain, refused 
to identify themselves with the English cause (189). Mean- 
while Philip and the Pope, through active military operations 
(190) and incessant intrigue, endeavored to weaken his posi- 

tWs Shprtly after his return from Coblentz, Benedict re- 
^weyer, tor ^. , . „ -, . . , 

monsLiii^.. 'iiiii lc : cidnig to enter into an alliance with 

Louis (191). Moved by this protest, he consented, on Novem- 
ber 15, to enter into further negotiations with "our cousin" 
who "calls himself King of France" (192). On December 15 
he accorded to Philip the title King of France (193).- But 
these proceedings simply furnished one more instance of the 
respect paid to papal influence and revealed the utter hope- 
lessness of any peaceful accommodation. 

During this same period, also, Philip was conducting a little 
negotiation on his own account, and with such success that for 
a while he detached the Emperor from the English alliance. 
Edward's braggadocio remarks (191) when he heard of what 
was going on serve but to bring out into clearer relief the 
chagrin which he had felt ever since he had discovered on what 
unstable foundations his hopes for aid against the French were 
laid (195). Under these conditions it is easy to imagine his 



EDWARD ITT, KING OF FRANCE. 569 

impatience as the day set for the meeting of his allies drew 
near. On July 16, 1339, before leaving Antwerp for Vilvoor- 
den, he sent to the Pope and college of cardinals an elaborate 
justification of his claims to the French throne (196). The date 
of this letter, coming on the eve of what he undoubtedly 
trusted would be a decisive campaign against Philip, is sig- 
nificant, and points to the conclusion that while Edward aimed 
to silence Benedict he also hoped to remove as far as possi- 
ble from the minds of the princes whatever scruples might 
remain to prove a barrier to their efficient service. 

The effect on Edward of this first invasion of France must 
have been very similar to that produced by his early boy- 
hood's experience against the Scotch. It was not until Sep- 
tember 20 that his columns were ready to advance, and, though 
he counted the Emperor's men in his ranks (197), the Duke of 
Brabant refused to join him until Cambrai had been formally 
invested. When this siege was raised and Edward had crossed 
the ancient borders of the Empire into France, the Counts of 
Namur and Hainault refused to advance any farther against 
their feudal suzerain. When Philip persistently declined a 
pitched battle others of the princes deserted the English ranks, 
and, on account of the time of year, there was nothing left for 
Edward to do but to return to Antwerp, where he arrived 
late in October (198). The prospects of another idle winter, 
with no better material upon which to build up his plans for 
a second campaign than that which had already proven itself 
so uncertain, must have been little pleasing to one of Edward's 
nature. But, all unknown to himself, new allies were being 
prepared for him by the short-sighted policy which Philip 
had recently inaugurated toward the Flemings. In spite of 
his first failure Edward had not yet utterly despaired of bring- 
ing Flanders to his side. Following his feudal prejudices, 
however, he still strove to win the favor of the Count, but 
yielding to military necessity, he also opened negotiations with 
the towns, and they now rallied to his support. 

The welcome which Sohier de Courtrai had accorded to the 
English ambassadors in 1337 revealed to Philip how natural it 
was for the "good towns" to formulate a political program 
in accordance with the dictates of their commercial interests 
(199). He accordingly urged upon the Count the advisability 
of winning their fidelity (200). The favors, however, which 



570 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

were heaped upon Bruges did not pacify Ghent, which, after 
all, proved to be the center of opposition. The stoppage of 
the English wool had created a business stagnation which was 
now resulting in starvation; and finally the people of the city 
were led to seek the advice of James Van Artevelde, who per- 
suaded them to assume a neutral polic} 7 toward the great 
struggle which was beginning to surge around their borders, 
in the hopes that each contestant would force the other to 
respect their position. They would thus escape the ravages 
of war, and prosperity would gradually return to them. 
Shortly after this Van Artevelde was elected captain of St. 
John (201). 

Philip, recognizing the importance of the action of the 
Gantois, immediatel} T instituted repressive measures. He or- 
dered their goods at Tourna} T and other places to be seized, 
and on January 12 summoned his forces to meet at Amiens at 
the middle of Lent. Recognizing, however, the difficulties in 
the way of an effective campaign, he soon adopted a temporiz- 
ing policy. Meanwhile at Ghent itself events soon convinced 
the citizens of the wisdom of their policy. On February 1 
representatives of the city had visited the Count of Gueldres, 
who was Edward's representative on the Continent, and gained 
from him a provisional promise of wool through Dordrecht. 
The Count in a Parliament at Bruges was compelled to agree 
to this arrangement, and in March the first consignment 
arrived. Edward, who hoped to make out of this small 
beginning a political alliance with Flanders, wrote most cor- 
dial letters to the towns on Ma} T 8 (202) expressing his desire 
for some permanent treaty. Delegates accordingly met at 
Antwerp. The Flemings, however, would agree only to a 
commercial compact which, among other things, recognized 
the neutralit} 7 of their country. This was signed on June 10 
and accepted by Edward on the 26th (203). Meanwhile Van 
Artevelde's policy received its full vindication by a promise 
which Philip made at Paris on the 13th to a similar agree- 
ment (20tL). So eager were the townspeople to maintain their 
position that when Edward, in his passage to the Continent, 
undertook, in direct contradiction to his promises, to stop at 
Sluys they collected, under the leadership of the captain of 
St. John, to prevent his landing (205). 

The first serious complication in this plan 44 to restore peace, 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



571 



liberty, and trade to the land " (206) came when the English 
King was made vicar of the Empire. Count Louis sent dele- 
gates to the meeting which Edward called at Mechlin soon 
after his return from Coblentz and announced his intentions 
to render all the services which he owed as lord of imperial 
Flanders. After that, however, he failed to respond to any 
advances (207), and the cities, as we have already seen, could 
not be tempted to abandon their neutral position, though 
the Emperor agreed to conquer for them Lille, Douai, and 
Bethune, and Edward promised not only to reestablish the 
staple among them, but as King of France to remove all the 
evil measures under which they were laboring (208). The 
first influence to destroy this situation came from Philip. 

Early in 1339 the French King again recognized the neu- 
trality of the towns, though he was undoubtedly aware that 
at that very moment secret measures were under way which 
would render neutrality impossible. Certain "leliaert' 1 
knights had organized in Lille, Douai, and S. Omer for the 
purpose of overthrowing Ghent and its confederate's. At 
Dixmund, on their way to Bruges, they were joined by Count 
Louis, who had come from Tournay, where a French army 
was being collected for the evident purpose of taking advan- 
tage of any favorable situation which this enterprise might 
create. Though the Brugeois easily warded off the danger 
which threatened them, the faith of the towns in the French 
King was rudely shaken, and in their protests they demanded 
the restoration of Lille, Douai, and Bethune, which Edward 
had so recently promised them. Though a definite answer 
was not given them, fear of an English incursion made caution 
necessary, so a general promise that they should receive jus- 
tice was made. On October 23, while Philip was facing Ed- 
ward's hosts near Flamengerie, the towns collected their 
forces, with the evident intention of attacking Lille and Douai 
if the English were successful, of defending themselves if the 
French were victorious. At this juncture the Count, appar- 
ently recognizing the danger of an English alliance (209), in 
view of the strained relations then existing with France, has- 
tened to Courtrai and called a Parliament for October 21 for 
the ostensible purpose of informing the towns that Philip had 
consented to their demands (210). The popular leaders, in- 
cluding Van Artevelde, fell into the trap. When the repre- 



572 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



sentatives of the cities came together, several days were 
wasted in useless discussion, and when Louis heard of Ed- 
ward's withdrawal he hastened into France. Chagrined at 
their own credulity and led by the invasions which now began 
on the French borders to see how lightly Philip regarded the 
neutrality which they had striven so strenuously to attain, 
the Flemish leaders were prepared to listen with willing 
minds to the new propositions for an English alliance, which 
soon came to them. 

The English King had returned to Antwerp after his fruit- 
less campaign with a quickened sense of the absolute need of 
winning the strength of Flanders to his side (211). At a 
meeting of the allies on November 12 it was determined to 
make one more trial in this direction (212). Edward, how- 
ever, moved by feudal prejudice, could not yet abandon the 
idea of gaining Louis's cooperation. On the 13th, there- 
fore, he sent offers of a matrimonial alliance to him. But at 
the same time recognizing that the real strength lay in the cit- 
ies, he promised them that as King of France he would not only 
maintain their ancient privileges, but would also grant them 
new ones. Then, as he had done before, he assured them that 
he would restore Lille, Douai, and Bethune, and finally agreed 
to use his influence toward removing the papal bans which 
Philip had caused to be placed upon them (213). On the 
15th he commissioned Brabant to treat for alliances and for 
the redress of grievances at Cadsand (214). The first fruits 
of these proceedings was a treaty signed on December 3, 
which provided for mutual aid between Edward and Brabant 
during the war and established extensive commercial privi- 
leges between Brabant and the Flemish cities (215). The 
respect of the townsmen for the letter of legality Was what 
apparently prevented them from going any further at this 
time, for Van Artevelde informed Edward that if he would 
formally assume the title and arms of France the people would 
loyally support him. On January 4, 1340, therefore, Edward 
sent commissioners to Ghent to consider this matter (216). 
A little later he visited the city himself, and at Artevelde's 
advice (217) quartered the arms of England and France. But as 
the Flemings were not satisfied without a title, so Edward was 
not fully content without their Count. On the 26th, there- 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



573 



fore, by the first public utterance in which he used his new 
signature as King of France, he released Sir Guy (218), who 
had been his prisoner ever since the battle of Cadsand. Like 
his previous attempts at conciliation, however, this was a 
failure. 

Though, as Froissart says, Edward hesitated to fully claim 
what he knew to be merely the shadow and not the substance 
of power, he was finally forced to do so by the pressure of 
military necessity. That he was inclined to consider the 
step somewhat seriously when once he had taken it is shown 
by his care to explain the whole proceeding to his English 
Parliament (219). But that he did not count Philip's position 
on the French throne as a fundamental cause for the war is 
shown by the ease with which he discarded his new title at 
the treaty of Bretigny for complete supremacy in Guienne 
and for the commercial advantages which came with the reten- 
tion of Calais (220). This latter fact, taken in connection 
with a proposition for a uniform currency for Flanders and 
England which was made in 1313, brings out a phase of the 
Hundred Years War which has generally been overlooked 
(221). 

In conclusion, it appears that Edward in his wars with 
both Scotland and France was striving to maintain what he 
thought to be his rights. In the first case he was on the offen- 
sive to regain a supremacy of which he felt himself unjustly de- 
prived by his mother's paramour; in the second, he was on the 
defensive to retain an inheritance which had come to him from 
his father, though, as we have seen, in an unsettled condition on 
account of the controversies of Edward IPs reign. The main 
charges, then, which can be preferred against him during the 
early years of his reign, are simply these: his question-able 
diplomacy preceding the Scotch outbreak and his inability to 
foresee the ultimate failure of both his northern and continen- 
tal struggles in view of the rising spirit of nationality which 
was just at this moment beginning to manifest itself in Europe. 
But our judgment in the first instance should be tempered by 
considering the political morality of the age in which he lived, 
and in the second by remembering how very few men can read 
correctly the signs of the times in which they themselves are 
moving. 



574 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



NOTES. 

[For list of authorities, with their abbreviations, see p. 581.] 

(1) Foed., ii, 483-563. 

(2) Foed., ii, 478; Rolls of Pari., ii, 3-5; Troke., 124. 

(3) Murim., 40; Foed., ii, 530. 

(4) Foed., ii, 521. 

(5) Murim., 40; Moore, 305. 

(6) Murim., 42. 

(7) Blanef., 144-145. 

(8) Pari. Writs, ii, Div. II, 286-288, 289, 291. 

(9) Foed., ii, 545-547. 

(10) Foed., ii, 551. 

(11) Blanef., 145; Foed., ii, 555-560. 

(12) Foed., ii, 563. 

(13) Foed., ii, 563, 573-574. 

(14) Foed., ii, 563. 

(15) Ann. Paul., 307; Foed., ii, 581-589. 

(16) Murim., 42. 

(17) Foed., ii, 600-601. 

(18) Foed., ii, 579. 

(19) Foed., ii, 591. 

(20) Foed., ii, 579. 

(21) Ann. Paul., 258-262. 

(22) Moore, 306. 

(23) Foed., ii, 595. 

(24) Ann. Paul., 308; Auc. Brid., 85. 

(25) Foed., ii, 596. 

(26) Foed., ii, 597-599. 

(27) Foed., ii, 601-602. 

(28) M. Malmesb., 280. 

(29) M. Malmesb., 282-283. 

(30) Foed., ii, 603-604. 

(31) Foed., ii, 604. 

(32) Et, de nouel, nous, a la requeste de nostre treschere soer, * * * 
en eas que le dit Roi d'Engleterre transportera en nostre chere neveu, 
Edward, * * * tout le droit, q'il a es terres * * * Foed., ii, 607. 
* * * Intercedente matre * * * Nang. , ii, 60. 

(33) Foed., ii, 607; Murim., 44. 

(34) Foed., ii, 611. 

(35) Foed., ii, 611; M. Malmesb., 285. 

(36) Avesb., 281; Moore, 307; Murim., 45. 

(37) M. Malmesb., 279. 

(38) Foed., ii, 615-616. 

(39) Foed., 622-623. 

(40) Foed., ii, 625-629. 

(41) Foed.", ii, 633. 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



575 



(42) Foed., ii, 633-634. 

(43) Foed., ii, 645, 649; Wals., i, 181-186; Moore, 309-310; Apol. Ad. Orl. 
in Decern Script., col. 2766; Pari. Writs., ii, Div. II, 350-351, 354, 364; Ang. 
Sac, i, 367-368. 

(44) Foed., ii, 684. 

(45) Foed., ii, 693-694. 

(46) Foed., ii, 700-703. 

(47) Foed., ii, 649. 

(48) Burton, ii, 297; Tytler, i, 336. 

(49) Avesb., 283. 

(50) Eodem anno inortuus est rex Franciie * * * Audiens autem 
rex Anglice mortem avunculi sui * * * et reputans se de jure proximum 
heredem * * * timens etiam nihilominus quod illi de Francia hunc 
non permitterent, sed alium * * * in regem eligerent * '* * de 
consilio pessimo matris suae et domini Rogeri de Mortuo-mari, qui erant 
ductores prsecipui regis * * * remittere Scotis est compulsus per 
cartam suam publicam omnem exactionem, jus, * * * Causa an tern, 
vel potius color, quare ista remissio vel gratiosa concessio fuit facta Scottis, 
[scilicet, quod haberent regnum suum libere et non tenerent illud de aliquo 
rege Angliee sicut de domino capitali], erat quia nisi rex prius fecisset 
pacem cum Scottis non potuisset Francos, qui eum exheredaverant, 
impugnasse, quin Scotti Angliam invasissent. Lanercost 261-62; see also 
Foed., ii, 736, 737, 742. 

(51) Monod, La Legende de la Loi salique et la succession au Trone 
de France, Rev. Crit, d'Hist. et de Litt. Dec. 26, 1892, pp. 515-520. 

(52) Martin, Hist, iv, 531, n. 1; Nang., i, 426-432; Bouquet, xxi, 45-47; 
Glasson, Droit et Inst, de la France, v. 417, is quite incorrect in saying 
' ' Mais les Etats Generaux deciderent, en invoquant la loi salique, que les 
f emmes etaient absolument excludes du troue de France. ' ' He has evi- 
dently made the mistake of reasoning from similarity to identity. There 
is no explicit reference to the Salic law until the latter part of the fourteenth 
century. See in this connection Monod and Viollet, L'acad. des Inscr. et 
Belles Lett,, Comptes Rendus, Dec. 9, 1892, p. 386. 

(53) Nang., ii, 2,9; Martin, iv, 550; Sismondi, ix, 353-354; Rayn., xv, 
149, sec. 6, 1317; Foed., ii, 304. 

(54) Foed., ii, 736-737. 

(55) Foed., ii, 743. 

(56) Foed., ii, 753,760; Frois. (Luce), i, 92. 

(57) Report on the Dignity of a Peer, i, 492; Calendar of Close Rolls, 
Edw. Ill, 1327-1330, 412. 

(58) Cal. of Close Rolls, Edw. Ill, 1327-1330, 412, 522; Foed., ii, 752, 756; 
Calendar of Patent Rolls, Edw. Ill, 1327-1330, 359. 

(59) Rolls of Pari., ii, 52, no. 1; Knight,, i, 451. 

(60) Nang., ii, 91-92. 

(61) Nang., ii, 105-106; Sismondi, x, 26, quoting from Vaisette, Hist, 
de Languedoc; Recits d'un Bourg. de Valen., 153; Chron. Reg. Franc, 
ii, 11. 

(62) Frois. (Luce), i, 92. 

(63) Foed., ii, 760. 



576 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



(64) Foed., ii, 764; Rayn., xvi, 113, sec. 11, 1340. 

(65) Frois. (Luce), i, 95-96. 

(66) Nang., ii, 107; Murim., 58-59; Foed., ii, 765. 

(67) Frois. (Luce), i, 96-97. 

(68) Foed., ii, 766,768,772,775,777-779; Nang., ii, 122. 

(69) * * * si forsan idem Rex viae pacis rationabiles recusaret. 
Foed., ii, 783. 

(70) Foed., ii, 785-786. 

(71) Foed., ii, 791-792. 

(72) Foed., ii, 797. 

(73) Foed., ii, 793-797. 

(74) Foed., ii, 797. 

(75) Foed., ii, 798-799. 

(76) Foed., ii, 799. 

(77) Foed., ii, 805-806. 

(78) Foed., ii, 813. As far back as April 22, 1329, even before Edward's 
visit to Amiens, an order had been given to the treasurer and chainberlain 
to receive from the keeper of the privy seal all documents relating to the 
dispute with France (Foed., ii, 761). In view of this fact and also of 
Edward's early acknowledgment of liege homage, Isabella's pretensions 
seem less excusable than they otherwise would have been, for we can 
hardly assume that she was acting in ignorance of the real situation. 

(79) Foed., ii, 815-816; Murim., 63. 

(80) Foed., ii, 816. 

(81) Foed., ii, 819-822. 

(82) The various measures for preserving the friendly relations between 
France and England which were made at this time are the result of Ed- 
ward's personal initiative, and are important as revealing his attitude 
toward the French question. 

(83) Rep. on the Dignity of a Peer, i, 492, App., 403. 

(84) Rolls of Pari., ii, 60-61, nos. 1 and 2; Foed., ii, 827. 

(85) Rolls of Pari., ii, 65, no. 9. 

(86) Rolls of Pari., ii, 65, no. 10; Foed., ii, 837-838. 

(87) Foed., ii, 811-812. 

(88) Rolls of Pari., ii, 61, no. 3. 

(89) Foed., ii, 831. 

(90) Foed., ii, 840; Rep. on the Dignity of a Peer, App., 413; Rolls of 
Pari., ii, 65, no. 10. 

(91) Rep. on the Dignity of a Peer, i, 492, App., 411. 

(92) Rolls of Pari., ii, 66, no. 3. 

(93) Avesb., 286-296. 

(94) Foed., ii, 804. 

(95) Foed., ii, 806-837. 

(96) Foed., ii, 795-796; Holinshed, England, ii, 600. 

(97) Leland, Coll. (Scala chronica), ii, 552, 553; Murim., 66; Knight., 
i, 462; Ann. Paul., 357. 

(98) Boece, ii, 1. xiv, c. 2, pp. 414-415; Knight., i, 461-462; Fordun 
(Goodall), 304, (Skene), i, 354; Murim., 66. 

(99) Foed., ii, 847. 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



577 



(100) Foed., ii, 847. 

(101) Foed., ii, 847-848. 

(102) Foed., ii, 843. 

(103) Rolls of Pari., ii, 66, no. 3. 

(104) Report on the Dignity of a Peer, i, 492, App., 416; Foed., ii, 846. 

(105) Foed., ii, 847, 860. 

(106) * * * leqnel il se devoit trere vers Escoce en clamant le 
Demeigne de meisme la terre, on de soi faire partie a prendre l'avantage 
d' aver en Service come ses auncestres avoient, * * * Rolls of Pari. , ii, 
p. 67, no. 1. 

(107) Report on the Dignity of a Peer, App., 418; Rolls of Pari., ii, 67, 
no. 1. 

(108) Foed., ii, 849. 

(109) Fordun (Goodall) ii, 307-308, (Skene), i, 356; Wyntoun, ii, 394-395. 

(110) Rolls of Pari., ii, 69, no. 7. 

(111) Leland, Coll., ii, 553-554; Foed., ii, 853. 

(112) Anc. Brid., 110-111; Hemingb., ii, 306-307. 

(113) Knight., i, 465-467; Hemingb., ii, 307. 

(114) Foed., ii, 855, 860; Rot. Scot., i, 233. 

(115) Foed., ii, 860. 

(116) Rot. Scot., i, 238. 

(117) Rot. Scot., i, 252. 

(118) Report on the Dignity of a Peer, i, App., 427. 

(119) Foed., ii, 894-895. 

(120) Foed., ii, 904; Rot, Scot., i, 335. 

(121) Rot, Scot., i, 305, 309, 320, 322. 

(122) Rot, Scot., i, 336-356; Foed., ii, 905-907. 

(123) Rot, Scot., i, 283-321; Foed., ii, 898-901. 

(124) Rot, Scot., 322, 327; Foed., ii, 903; Fordun, (Goodall) ii, 317. 

(125) Rot. Scot., i, 357-375; Foed., ii, 911, 917, 919. 

(126) Acts of the Pari, of Scotland, xii, suppl., 5a-7a; gives this treaty 
in full. It was signed by Charles IV in April, 1326, at Corbeil. The force 
of this compact was recognized in the treaty which Mortimer made" with 
the Scots after Edward's disastrous campaign in 1327. Philip's disinter- 
estedness, however, is strongly discredited by his actions in connection 
with Guienne and the evident insincerity of his peace projects. 

(127) Avesb., 298-300. 

(128) Auc. Brid., 125-126. 

(129) Foed., ii, 914-915. 

(130) Rayn., xvi, 10-11, sec. 37, 1335, gives Benedict's letter in full 
and is introduced as follows: Turn Francorum Regem, auxilia Scoto sub- 
mittere meditantem, ab ejusmodi consilio avocare est conatus. 

(131) Foed., ii, 942. 

(132) Foed., ii, 944; Rep on the Dignity of a Peer, App., 460. 

(133) Rot. Scot., i, 449; Foed., ii, 945, 1110. 
• (134) Stubbs, Const. Hist., ii, 397, n. 2. 

(135) Fordun, (Goodall), ii, 324, (Skene), i, 362-363; Hemingb., ii, 312. 

(136) Fordun, (Goodall), ii, 324, (Skene), i, 363. 



H. Doc. 548, pt 1 37 



578 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



(137) Rot. Scot., i, 475; Foed., ii, 956. 

(138) Foed., ii, 946, 949-950. 

(139) Rep. on the Dignity of a Peer, App., 464, 467. 

(140) Frois. (Luce), i, 314-315, 349-350 (ms. d ? Amiens); Rayn., xvi, 37, 
sec. 42, 1336. 

(141) Frois. (Lettenhove), xviii, 33-34; Bliss, Papal Letters, ii, 561-562; 
Rayn., xvi, 36-37, 39, sees. 42-43, 46, 1336. 

(142) Rot. Scot., i, 482. 

(143) Frois. (Luce), i, 119-123, 359-368 (ms. d' Amiens); 357-367 (ms. 
de Rome); Leland, Coll. (Scala chronica), ii, 556. 

(144) Foed., ii, 966. It is to "magnifico principe, domino Philippo 
Rege Franciae ' ' that credence is given. 

(145) Frois. (Lettenhove), xviii, 158-159 (Relation de Jean de 
Thrandestone). 

(146) Frois. (Luce), i, 125-126, 369-377 (ms. d' Amiens), 374-377 (ms. de 
Rome), (Lettenhove), ii, 525; Rec. d'un Bourg. de Valenciennes, 159; 
Chron. Reg. Franc, ii, 33-34; Jehan le Bel, i, 119-125. 

(147) Frois. (Lettenhove), xviii, 31-32 (Archives de Lille), 47-50; 
Foed., ii, 994. 

(148) Frois. (Luce), i, 377-380 (ms. d' Amiens), clxxxv, n. 1, (Letten- 
hove), xviii," 34. 

(149) Foed., ii, 973, etc.; Frois. (Lettenhove), xviii, 159, (Relation de 
Jean de Thrandestone); for the relations between France and Germany at 
this time see Leroux, Rel. Polit. de la Fr. avec l'Allem, 1292-1378. 

(150) Foed., ii, 974. 

(151) Foed., ii, 989-994. 

(152) Foed., ii, 991-992. 

(153) Pro Rege Francorum se gerentem. 

(154) Frois. (Lettenhove), xviii, 159. 

(155) Foed., ii, 998. 

(156) Foed., ii, 998-1000. 

(157) * * * A iiij t0 die Octobris * * * quo die recessit cum sua 
familia de London. Nuncii Roll of the Bishop of London, preserved in 
the Tower of London. 

(158) Chron. Reg. Franc, ii, 35-38; Frois. (Lettenhove), xviii, 530, 531 
(Chron. deBern); Nang., ii, 157. * * * 

(159) * * * Danteseisdem * * * plenam potestatem et manda- 
tum speciale tractandi pro nobis et nomine nostro cum magnifico Principe 
domino Philippo Rege Franciae * * * super jure regni Francise, utram 
sibi, vel nobis debeat remanere. * * * Early Chancery Rolls, pre- 
served in the Tower of London; Chron. Reg. Franc, ii, 39-40; Frois. 
(Luce), i, 403-404 (ms. d' Amiens), which contains a letter of defiance 
dated October 19. 

(160) Foed., ii, 1000-1001. 

(161) Nang., ii, 159; Chron. Reg. Franc, 40-43; Frois. (Luce), i, 404- 
405 (ms. d' Amiens). 

(162) Foed., ii, 1029-1031. Fordun (Goodall), ii, 324, (Skene), i, 262-263. 

(163) Foed., ii, 1004. 



EDWARD III. KING OF FRANCE. 



579 



(164) Foed, ii, 1007. 

(165) Ashley, James and Philip van Artevelde, p. 63; Chron. de Fland. 
(Corpus Chron., i, 357). 

(166) Foed., ii, 948; Frois. (Luce), i, 388-389 (ms. d' Amiens). 

(167) Foed., ii, 952. 

(168) Foed., ii, 961; Frois. (Luce), i, 389 (ms. d' Amiens). 

(169) Foed., ii, 966-67. 

(170) Ashley, James and Philip van Artevelde, 76-77, 81. 

(171) Chron. Reg. Franc, 42-43; Frois. (Lettenhove), ii, 527-528; (Luce), 
i, 129-130; Foed., ii, 1034. 

(172) Chron. Reg. Franc, ii, 43, n. 2. 

(173) Chron. Reg. Franc, ii, 44. 

(174) Murim., 80; Auc.Brid., 133; Frois. (Luce), i, 402 (ms. d' Amiens); 
Knight., ii, 1-2. 

(175) Frois. (Luce), i, 132-138. . 

(176) Foed., ii, 1009-1012. 

(177) Sicque responsum est cardinalibus * * * quod rex non se con- 
cordaret cum rege Franciae nisi sub conditione quod redderet ei terras suas 
quas ultra mare nequiter * * * adhuc occupaverat. Knight., ii, 3. 

(178) Foed., ii, 1011. 

(179) Sismondi, x, 130 (from Vaissette, Hist, de Languedoc). 

(180) Foed., ii, 1024, 1042; Hemingb, 315. 

(181) Foed., ii, 1022. 

(182) Foed., ii, 1023-1033. 

(183) Foed., ii, 1034. 

(184) Foed., 1034-1050; Jean de Klerk, Edouard III, Roi d'Angleterre 
en Belgique. 

(185) Foed., ii, 1043, 1051, 1054, etc 

(186) Murim., 84-85; Foed., ii, 1051, 1054, 1057. 

(187) Foed., 1057,1058. 

(188) Knight, ii, 5; Frois. (Luce), i, 144-145, 424-425. 

(189) Foed., ii, 1055, 1063; Frois. (Lettenhove), ii, 548-551. 

(190) Frois. (Luce), i, 153-158, (Lettenhove), xviii, 67-73. 

(191) Foed., ii, 1063. 

(192) Foed., ii, 1065. 

(193) Foed., ii, 1068." 

(194) C'est pour mon plus grand a vantage que Dieu a voulu que mon 
projet s'ex^cutat d'une autre maniere. Si Tempereur s'etait mele de cette 
guerre et que le succes eut couronne nos efforts, la renommee lui aurait a 
jamais attribue les honneurs de la victoire, sans £gard pour celui a qui elle 
aurait ete vraiment due. En outre, il est au ban du saint siege de Rome. 
Jean de Klerk, Edouard III, Roi d'Angleterre en Belgique, 10-11. 

(195) Et cum rex venisset in illas partes non invenit in quo confidere 
posset * * * et exinde dixit Lyncolniensi episcopo * * * non sibi 
bene consultum fuisse. Knight., ii, 5. 

(196) Foed., ii, 1086. 

(197) Foed., ii, 1088. 

(198) Foed., ii, 1094; Frois. (Luce), i, 152-184. 



580 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



(199) For the internal history of Flanders at this time see Lettenhove, 
Hist, de Flandre and Jacques d'Artevelde; Vanderkindere, Le siecle des 
Artevelde; Ashley, James and Philip van Artevelde. 

(200) Frois. (Luce), i, 387-393 (ms. d' Amiens). 

(201) Ashley, 93, and references to Corpus Chron., i, 211; ii, 219. 

(202) Foed., ii, 1035. 

(203) Foed., ii, 1045; Frois. (Lettenhove), xviii, 56-62, from Arch. 
d'Ypres. 

(204) Frois. (Lettenhove), xviii, 62-63, from Arch, de Bruges et de 
Lille. 

(205) Anno MCCCXXXVIII, * * * venit rex Anglise * * * ante 
Sclusam, volens descendere in terrain, sed Flandrenses, duce Jacobo de 
Artevelde, se opposuerunt, et sic recessit, et venit in villain de Antwerpia. 
Chron. vEgidii di Muisis (Corpus Chron., ii, 220). 

(206) Omme te helpen settene 't land in rusten, in wette, in payse, in 
vrieden ende in neringhe. Lettenhove, Hist., ii, 294, n. 1, from Comptes 
de la ville de Gand. 

(207) Foed., ii, 1063, 1097. 

(208) Foed., ii, 1055; Frois. (Lettenhove), ii, 548-551, from Arch. 
d'Ypres. 

(209) Ashley, 115. 

(210) Lettenhove, J. van Artevelde, 61. 

(211) Frois., i, 184-188. 

(212) Lettenhove, J. van Artevelde, 62. 

(213) Ad tractandum * * * cum prsefato comite et hominibus de 
Flandria, conjunctim et divisim, super alligantiis et amicitiis per- 
petuis. * * * 

Et ad antiqua libertates * * * quae comites et homines Flandriae, 
quae fuerunt pro tempore nostro, et temporibus progenitorum nostrorum, 
regum Franciae et Angliae, tarn in regno Francis, ad nos jam jure hsere- 
ditario devoluto, quam in regno nostro Anglic ac in Flandria, et alibi, 
habuerunt, quatenus ad nos attinet, innovandum et confirmandum, et 
novas libertates et privilegia concedendum. 

Necnon ad restituendum * * * comitatui Flandriae, et districtui 
dictorum comitis et hominum * * * omnia et singula castra * * * 
quae sunt infra fines dicti comitatus, et subjecta fuerant comitibus et 
hominibus Flandriae ab antiquo. * * * 

Necnon ad consentiendum et concedendum, ut omnes et singuli processus 
et sententise, ad instantiam regum, vel cujuscumque regis Francije, contra 
homines et inhabitatores Flandrke, per sedem apostoiicam facti, lati, seu 
promulgati, relaxentur et subducantur. Foed., ii, 1097. 

(214) Foed., ii, 1097. 

(215) Frois. (Lettenhove), xviii, 96-107; Longman, Edward HI, 155. 
The date, however, is given incorrectly. 

(216) Super alligantiis * * * inter nos * * * et praefatum comi- 
tem, ac dictos homines de Flandria * * * 

Et auxiliis nobis per ipsos, pro recuperatione regni nostri Francise, 
effectualiter impendendis. 



EDWARD III, KING OF FRANCE. 



581 



Necnon de recognitione nostrae superioritatis, in dicto regno Franciae, 
per eos nobis, ut regi Franciae facienda. Foed., ii, 1106. 

( 217 ) Median te quodam vassalo nomine Jacobo de Artyngfeld Flandrico, 
rex Edwardus cepit arma Franciae et cum armis suis Angliae immiscuit. 
Knight., ii., 14; Murim., 103; Chron. Reg. Franc, ii, 90. 

* * * per Flammingos iterum receptus est, et, de consilio ipsorum, 
se regem Franciae et Angliae vocari fecit., Nang., ii, 183-184. 
* * * consilio Brabantinorum et Flandrensium, arma Franciae suis 
armis immiscuit. Chron. Ang., 8. 

(218) Ob specialem affectionem, quam ad personam praefati Guidonis 
gerimus et habemus. 

Volentes eidem Guidoni gratiam in praemissis facere specialem. 
Ipsum a captivitate praedicta liberavimus * * * 

Dat' apud Gandanum vicesimo sexto die Januarii, anno regni nostri 
Franciae primo, Angliae vero quartodecimo. Foed., ii, 1107. 

It is important to note that Edward dates this letter in the first year of 
his reign as King of France, thus giving us his own testimony to the little 
value he placed in his earlier pretensions. 

(219) Foed., ii, 1115. 

(220) Foed., hi, 487. 

(221) Rolls of Pari., ii, 137-138; Cunningham, article in Transactions of 
Roy. Hist. Soc. for 1889, pp. 197-220. 



LIST OF AUTHORITIES WITH THEIR ABBREVIATIONS. 

Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland. Thomson, T. and Innes, C, editors. 

(Record Commission.) 
Anglia Sacra, sive Collectio Historiarum * * * de Archiepiscopis et 

Episcopis Angliae, etc. Wharton, H., editor. London, 1691. 
Annales Paulini, in Chronicles of the Reigns of Edw. I and Edw. II. 

Stubbs, Wm., editor. (Chron. and Mem. of Great Brit.) 
Apologia Adae Orlton, in Historiae Anglicanae Scriptores X. Twysden, 

(Sir) Roger, editor. London, 1652. 
Ashley, W. J. James and Philip van Artevelde. London, 1883. 
(Auc. Brid.) Gesta Edwardi de Carnarvan Auctore Canonico Bridling- 

toniensi, in Chronicles of the Reigns of Edw. I and Edw. II. Stubbs, 

W., editor. (Chron. and Mem. of Great Brit.) 
(Avesb.) Robertus de Avesbury De Gestis Mirabilibus Regis Edwardi 

Tertii. Thompson, E. M., editor. (Chron. and Mem. of Great Brit.) 
(Blanef.) Henrici de Blaneford Chronica, in Chronica Monasterii S. 

Albani. Riley, H. T., editor. (Chron. and Mem. of Great Brit.) 
(Bliss.) Calendar of entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great 

Britain and Ireland. Bliss, William Henry, and Johnson C, editors. 

London, 1893-97. 



582 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



Boece, Hector. The History of the Chronicles of Scotland, translated by 

J. Bellenden. Edinb., 1821. 
Bouquet (I). ) Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France jusqu' en 

1328. Paris, 1738-1833. Continue" par l'Academie des Inscsr. Paris, 

1840-76. 

Burton, John Hill. History of Scotland from Agricola's Invasion to the 
Extinction of the last Jacobite Insurrection. 2nd. ed. Edinb., 1873. 

Calendar of Close Rolls, Edward III, 1327-30. (Great Brit. Pub. Record 
Office.) 

Calendar of Patent Rolls, Edward III, 1327-30. (Great Brit. Pub. Record 
Office. ) 

Chronicon Anglian ab anno Domini 1328 usque ad annum 1388. Thomp- 
son, E. M., editor. (Chron. and Mem. of Great Brit.) 

Chronographia Regum Francorum, Moranville, H., editor. (La Societe de 
l'Hist. de France.) 

Corpus Chronicorum Flandriae or Recueil des Chroniques de Flandre, 
Smet, Joseph Jean de, editor. Bruxelles, 1837-65. 

Cunningham, W. The Commercial Policy of Edward III. In Transac- 
tions of the Royal Historical Society for 1889, pp. 197-220. 

Early Chancery Holls, manuscript preserved in the Tower of London. 

Foedera * * * accurante. T. Rymer. (Record Commission.) 

Fordun, Johannis de. Scotichronicon, cum Supplementis ac Continua- 
tione * * * cura Walteri Goodall. Edinb., 1759. 

Fordun, Johannis de. Chronica Gentis Scotorum, edited by W. F. Skene. 
(Historians of Scotland. ) Edinb., 1871-2. 

Froissart, Jean. Chroniques, par M. le baron Kervyn de Lettenhove. 
Bruxelles, 1870-77. 

Froissart, Jean. Chroniques * * * par S. Luce (i-viii) G. Raynaud 
(ix-xi). (La Societe de l'Hist. de France.) 

Glasson, Ernest Desire. Histoire de Droit et des Institutions de la France. 
Paris, 1887-96. 

(Hemingb. ) Hemingford or Hemingburgh, Walter de. Chronicon de 
gestis regum Anglire, recensuitH. C. Hamilton. Lond., 1848—49. (Eng. 
Hist. Soc. ) 

Holinshed, Raphael [and others]. Chronicles of England, Scotland, and 

Ireland. Lond., 1807-8. 
Jean de Klerk, Edouard III. Roi d'Angleterre en Belgique. Gand, 

1841. 

Jehan le Bel. Les Vrayes Chroniques de Messire Jehan le Bel * * * 

pub. par M. L. Polain. Bruxelles, 1863. 
(Knight.) Chronicon Henrici Knighton vel Cnitthon, Monachi Leyces- 

trensis. Lumly, J. R., editor. (Chron. and Mem. of Great Brit.) 
(Lanercost. ) Chronicon de Lanercost. Stevenson, J., editor. (Maitland 

Club.) 

Leland, John. De Rebus Brittanicis Collectanea, ed. altera. Lond., 1770. 
Leroux, Auguste Alfred. Recherches critiques sur les relations politiques 

de la France avec l'Allemagne de 1292 a 1378. Paris, 1882. (Bib. de 

l'Ecole des hautes Etudes.) 



EDWARD III, KmG OF FRANCE. 



583 



Lettenhove, le baron Kervyn de. Histoire de Flandre. Bruges, 1853-54. 
Lettenhove, le baron Kervyn de. Jacques d'Artevelde. Gand, 1863. 
Longman, William. History of the Life and Times of Edward III. Lon- 
don, 1869. 

(M. Malemsb.) Monachi cujusdam Malemsberiensis vita Edwardi II, in 

Chronicles of the Reigns of Edw. I and Edw. II. Stubbs, W., editor. 

(Chron. and Mem. of Great Brit.) 
Martin, Bon Louis Henri. Histoire de France. 4 e ed. Paris, 1855-60. 
Monod, G. La L£gende de la Loi salique et la Succession au Trone de 
- France. Art. in Revue Crit. d' Hist, et de Litt. Dec. 26, 1892, pp. 515-20. 
(Moore. ) . Vita et Mors Edwardi II. Conscripta a Thoma de la Moore, in 

Chronicles of the Reigns of Edw. I and Edw. II. Stubbs, W., editor. 

(Chron. and Mem. of Great Brit.) 
(Murim.) Adse Murimuth Continuatio Chronicarum. Thompson, E. 

M., editor. (Chron. and Mem. of Great Brit.) 
(Nang. ) Chronique Latine de Guillaume de Nangis de 1113 a 1300 avec 

les Continuations de cette Chronique de 1300 a 1368. Geraud, H., editor. 

(La Societe de FHist. de France.) 
Nuncii Roll of the Bishop of London. Manuscript preserved in the 

Tower of London. 

(Pari. Writs.) The Parliamentary Writs and the Writs of Military Sum- 
mons. Palgrave, Sir F. , editor. (Record Commission. ) 

(Rayn. ) Annales Ecclesiastici, 1198-1565. Auctore Odorico Raynaldo. 
Colonise Agrippinse, 1694-1727. 

Recits d' un Bourgeois de Valenciennes, pub. * * * par M. le baron 
Kervyn de Lettenhove. Louvain, 1877. 

Report on the Dignity of a Peer. (Pari. Papers, 1826.) 

Rolls of Parliament or Rotuli Parliamentorum, 1278-1503. London, n. d. 
Index, London, 1832. 

Rotuli Scotise in Turri Londinensi et in Domo Capitulari Westmonast. 
asservanti. Macpherson, D., etc., editors. (Record Commission. ) 

Sismondi, Jean Ch. Leonard Simonde de. Histoire des Francais. Paris, 
1821-44. 

Stubbs, William. The Constitutional History of England. Oxford, 1874- 
90. 

(Troke.) Johannis de Trokelowe Annales. In Chronica Monasterii S. 

Albani. Riley, H. T., editor. (Chron. and Mem. of Great Brit.) 
Tytler, Patrick Fraser. History of Scotland. Edinb., 1841-43. 
Vanderkindere, Leon. Le Siecle des Artevelde. Bruxelles, 1879. 
Viollet, Paul. Note in L' Acad, des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. Comptes 

Rendus, 1892. p. 386. 
(Wals.) Thomse Walsingham, quondam Monachi S. Albani, Historia 

Anglicana, in Chronica Monasterii S. Albani. Riley, H. T., editor. 

(Chron. and Mem. of Great Brit.) 
Wyntoun, Androw of. The Orygynale Crony kil of Scotland. Edited by 

D. Laing. Edinb., 1872-79. (Historians of Scotland.) 



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